Fire And Explosion
BioLab Inc. Trichloroisocyanuric Acid Pool Chemical Fire
BioLab, Inc. (A Lonza Group Company)
📍 Westlake, LA
Incident: August 27, 2020 • CSB Report: 2022
0
Fatalities
0 (community shelter-in-place; facility extensively damaged)
Injuries / Affected
Trichloroisocyanuric Acid / TCCA (Pool Sanitizer Chemical — Water-Reactive Fire
Chemical Involved
3
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On August 27, 2020, a fire broke out at the BioLab Inc. chemical manufacturing and warehousing facility in Westlake, Louisiana, after Hurricane Laura made landfall and caused severe damage to the facility. The fire involved trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA) — a pool sanitizer chemical that reacts violently with water and moisture, generating chlorine gas and other toxic combustion products.

Hurricane Laura damaged the facility roof and allowed rainwater to contact stored TCCA, triggering an exothermic water-reactive fire that burned for multiple days and generated a large toxic plume of chlorine gas and combustion products. The fire and toxic release required shelter-in-place orders for communities surrounding the facility and caused extensive damage to the BioLab plant.

The CSB investigation examined BioLab's preparedness for hurricane impacts at a facility storing large quantities of a water-reactive chemical. The investigation addressed the adequacy of the facility's emergency planning for natural hazard scenarios and the PSI documenting the water-reactive hazard of TCCA storage.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Hurricane Laura Damage Allowed Water to Contact Water-Reactive TCCA
Hurricane Laura caused roof damage to the BioLab facility that allowed rainwater to contact stored TCCA. The water-reactive nature of TCCA caused an exothermic reaction that initiated the fire that burned for multiple days.
Finding 02
TCCA Fire Generated Toxic Chlorine Gas Plume — Community Shelter-in-Place
The TCCA fire generated a large toxic plume of chlorine gas and combustion products that spread into surrounding communities. Shelter-in-place orders were issued for communities near the facility as the plume spread.
Finding 03
Water-Reactive Hazard of TCCA Not Adequately Addressed in Natural Hazard Preparedness
BioLab's emergency planning and facility design had not adequately addressed the scenario of a natural hazard event causing water intrusion into storage areas containing large quantities of water-reactive chemicals.
Finding 04
TCCA Fire Burned for Multiple Days — Facility Extensively Damaged
The TCCA fire was difficult to extinguish because of the water-reactive nature of the chemical — water application accelerated rather than suppressed the reaction. The fire burned for multiple days and caused extensive damage to the BioLab facility.
Finding 05
Natural Hazard Scenarios Must Be Incorporated into PSM Emergency Planning
The BioLab incident highlighted the gap in PSM emergency planning for natural hazard scenarios — hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes — that can cause loss of containment or create conditions for chemical reactions at facilities in natural hazard-prone areas.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Facility Not Designed to Prevent Water Intrusion into TCCA Storage Under Hurricane Conditions
The BioLab facility was not designed or prepared to prevent water intrusion into TCCA storage areas under the conditions created by a major hurricane. The combination of a water-reactive chemical and a facility vulnerable to water intrusion created a foreseeable fire scenario that was not adequately controlled.
2
Emergency Planning Did Not Address Water-Reactive Chemical Fire Resulting from Natural Hazard
Emergency planning at BioLab had not specifically addressed the scenario of a water-reactive chemical fire resulting from a natural hazard event causing structural damage and water intrusion. This scenario was foreseeable given the facility location and the nature of the chemical stored.
3
TCCA Water-Reactive Hazard Presented Firefighting Challenge
The water-reactive nature of TCCA prevented conventional fire suppression. Firefighting crews could not apply water to the fire without accelerating the reaction. The absence of alternative suppression planning for a TCCA fire extended the duration of the incident.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ BioLab / Chemical Manufacturers in Natural Hazard Zones
Conduct natural hazard vulnerability assessments for all facilities storing water-reactive, flammable, or toxic chemicals in hurricane, flood, tornado, or earthquake hazard zones; implement structural hardening and water intrusion prevention for chemical storage areas; develop specific emergency response plans for natural hazard-initiated chemical incidents.
→ OSHA / EPA
Require natural hazard scenarios to be addressed in PSM/RMP emergency planning for facilities in natural hazard-prone areas; issue guidance on natural hazard vulnerability assessment for chemical facilities.
→ Louisiana GOHSEP / State Emergency Management
Develop pre-incident response plans for water-reactive and other hazardous chemical facilities in coastal Louisiana; coordinate with facility operators on natural hazard fire response protocols before incidents occur.
💡 Lessons Learned
Water-reactive chemicals — including TCCA, sodium and potassium, calcium hypochlorite, and many organometallic compounds — present a firefighting challenge that conventional fire departments may not be prepared for unless pre-incident planning has specifically addressed the chemical. When a water-reactive chemical fire occurs, applying water makes it worse. Fire departments that arrive at a TCCA warehouse fire and apply water hose streams will accelerate the chlorine release and the fire. Pre-incident planning must communicate the water-reactive nature of the chemical and identify non-aqueous suppression options before the fire occurs.
Natural hazards are foreseeable process safety scenarios for chemical facilities located in natural hazard-prone areas. A facility in coastal Louisiana that stores water-reactive chemicals has a foreseeable hurricane scenario in which wind damage, roof failure, or flooding allows water to contact the chemical. This scenario is not a black swan event — it is a predictable consequence of the intersection of facility location, facility design, and the physical properties of the stored material. PSM and RMP emergency planning must treat natural hazard scenarios as credible, foreseeable events requiring pre-developed response plans.
The BioLab incident occurred during the same hurricane season as the BioLab Conyers, Georgia facility fire in 2020 (a separate calcium hypochlorite fire). Two fires at pool chemical facilities in the same year illustrates the systemic nature of pool sanitizer chemical hazard management across the industry. Trichloroisocyanuric acid, calcium hypochlorite, and related pool chemicals are produced and stored in large quantities at facilities across the country, and many of these facilities are in natural hazard-prone areas. The industry-wide lesson is the same: water-reactive pool chemicals require specifically designed storage, firefighting pre-planning, and natural hazard preparedness.
PSI: Process Safety InformationSOP: Operating ProceduresEAP: Emergency Planning & ResponseMI: Mechanical Integrity
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Has your facility conducted a natural hazard vulnerability assessment specifically for the scenario of structural damage allowing water to contact water-reactive, toxic, or flammable chemicals stored at the facility?
►Does your emergency action plan include a specific response protocol for a water-reactive chemical fire? Does the plan identify non-aqueous suppression options and communicate WATER-DO NOT APPLY requirements to local fire departments in pre-incident planning?
►For facilities in hurricane, flood, or earthquake zones: have you assessed the structural integrity of chemical storage buildings against the applicable natural hazard loading? Are there structural hardening measures or water intrusion prevention systems in place?
Immediate Action Items
✓Identify all water-reactive chemicals stored at your facility; document water-reactive fire hazards and firefighting constraints in PSI and in pre-incident plans provided to local fire departments.
✓Conduct a natural hazard vulnerability assessment for your facility location; identify scenarios in which natural hazard events could cause water intrusion, structural damage, or loss of containment for hazardous chemicals.
✓Update emergency action plan to include specific response procedures for water-reactive chemical fires; coordinate non-aqueous suppression options with local fire department in pre-incident planning.
✓Assess structural integrity of chemical storage areas against hurricane, flood, or earthquake loads applicable to your location; implement hardening measures for highest-risk storage areas.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident traced to breakdowns across 4 PSM elements (PSI · SOP · EAP · MI). Each represents a documented gap that process safety documentation and consulting can close before a similar event occurs at your facility.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
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Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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