CSB Investigation — Toxic Gas Release
Catalyst Refiners Fatal Chemical Incident
Catalyst Refiners, Inc.
📍 Nitro, WV
Incident Date: April 22, 2026  |  CSB Investigation Ongoing
2
Fatalities
30+
Sought Medical Care
H2S Release
Chemical / Hazard
Decommissioning
Activity Type
📋 Incident Summary

On April 22, 2026, two workers were killed and more than 30 others sought medical care following a toxic hydrogen sulfide (H2S) release at the Catalyst Refiners, Inc. facility in Nitro, West Virginia. The incident occurred during the cleaning and decommissioning of process equipment — a non-routine activity that required the mixing of chemicals that generated H2S gas inside an occupied building.

The H2S release resulted from the unintended mixing of nitric acid with a proprietary cleaning agent called M2000A during decommissioning of a tank. The chemical reaction between these two substances generated toxic hydrogen sulfide gas inside the building where multiple employees were working. The gas rapidly incapacitated workers who were exposed, and the enclosed building environment allowed concentrations to build to fatal and injurious levels before evacuation could be completed.

The CSB opened an investigation. The investigation is examining the chemical hazard identification process for the decommissioning activity, H2S monitoring and alarm systems, the adequacy of confined space and toxic gas controls during decommissioning, and the facility process safety management system. The incident highlights the specific and often underappreciated chemical hazards of decommissioning and cleaning activities.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 1
H2S Generated by Reactive Chemical Mixing
Nitric acid and the proprietary cleaning agent M2000A reacted to produce hydrogen sulfide — a toxic gas immediately dangerous to life at 100 ppm — inside an occupied building.
Finding 2
Decommissioning as High-Hazard Non-Routine Activity
Equipment decommissioning and chemical cleaning are non-routine activities that can introduce chemical hazards not present during normal operations. Specific hazard analysis for these activities is required but not always performed.
Finding 3
Enclosed Building Allowed H2S Accumulation
The enclosed building environment prevented rapid dilution of the generated H2S, allowing concentrations to build to injurious and fatal levels in the building atmosphere.
Finding 4
Two Deaths from Toxic Gas Exposure
Two workers were killed by H2S exposure. H2S kills rapidly at high concentrations — the time from initial exposure to incapacitation can be measured in seconds at IDLH concentrations.
Finding 5
More Than 30 Workers Required Medical Care
The widespread impact across 30+ workers indicates the H2S cloud affected a large portion of the building population before evacuation could be completed.
Finding 6
CSB Investigation Ongoing
The CSB investigation is underway. Full findings and recommendations are pending completion of the investigation.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Reactive Chemical Hazard Not Identified for Decommissioning Activity
The hazard of mixing nitric acid with M2000A to produce H2S during decommissioning was not identified and addressed in the work plan, pre-job hazard analysis, or chemical compatibility review.
2
Inadequate H2S Monitoring and Detection
No H2S monitoring or detection system provided early warning before concentrations reached injurious and fatal levels in the occupied building.
3
Decommissioning Without Adequate Hazard Analysis
The decommissioning activity was conducted without a pre-job hazard analysis adequate to identify the reactive chemical hazard of the cleaning agent combination used.
4
CSB Investigation Ongoing
Full root cause determination is pending completion of the CSB investigation.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Catalyst Refiners
Implement pre-job hazard analysis requirements for all decommissioning and chemical cleaning activities that specifically evaluate chemical compatibility and toxic gas generation hazards.
→ Catalyst Refiners
Install fixed H2S detection with automatic alarm and evacuation trigger in all buildings where H2S generation from chemical reactions is a credible scenario.
→ OSHA / Industry
Develop specific guidance on hazard analysis requirements for chemical cleaning and decommissioning activities, particularly those involving acid or oxidant introduction to equipment containing residual chemicals.
💡 Lessons Learned
⚠ Decommissioning and chemical cleaning activities introduce chemical hazards not present during normal operations. Pre-job hazard analysis must specifically evaluate chemical compatibility and toxic gas generation.
⚠ Hydrogen sulfide kills in seconds at high concentrations. There is no time for evacuation after a large H2S release in an enclosed building unless detection and alarm systems provide early warning.
⚠ Chemical compatibility review must include all chemicals that may contact each other during cleaning, not just the cleaning agent and the intended substrate. Residual chemicals in equipment can react with cleaning agents to produce unexpected toxic products.
⚠ Mixing of cleaning chemicals in process equipment is a reactive chemistry scenario. The same rigor applied to reactive chemistry in production operations must be applied to chemical cleaning and decommissioning.
⚠ Fixed H2S detection with automatic alarm is a life-safety requirement wherever H2S generation from process chemistry, cleaning activities, or equipment residuals is credible.
PSM Elements: PHA · SOP · HOW · MI · TRN
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Decommissioning Chemical Hazards & H2S Safety
💬Do our work procedures for chemical cleaning and decommissioning require a pre-job hazard analysis that specifically evaluates chemical compatibility of all cleaning agents with residual chemicals in equipment?
💬Do we have fixed H2S detection with automatic alarm and evacuation triggers in all buildings where H2S generation from chemical reactions or equipment cleaning is credible?
💬Are workers who perform chemical cleaning and decommissioning specifically trained on the reactive chemistry hazards of cleaning agents and the toxic gas generation potential?
💬Do we require chemical compatibility review for all cleaning agent combinations that may contact residual process chemicals during tank or equipment cleaning?
💬Are all non-routine activities — decommissioning, chemical cleaning, turnaround maintenance — subject to the same pre-job hazard analysis rigor as production process changes?
✎ Team Action Items
✓Review work procedures for chemical cleaning and decommissioning activities — confirm they include mandatory chemical compatibility review and pre-job hazard analysis
✓Identify all areas in your facility where H2S generation from chemical reactions, equipment residuals, or process upsets is credible — verify fixed H2S detection with automatic alarm is installed and calibrated
✓Pull a recent work permit for a chemical cleaning or decommissioning activity and verify it included chemical compatibility review for all chemicals that might contact each other
✓Confirm workers performing chemical cleaning are trained on the toxic gas generation hazards of cleaning agents used and know the emergency response for unexpected H2S release
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident traced to breakdowns across 5 PSM elements (PHA · SOP · HOW · MI · TRN). Each represents a documented gap that process safety documentation and consulting can close before a similar event occurs at your facility.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions — a root cause here — is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Hot Work Permits
Unauthorized or poorly controlled ignition sources near flammable atmospheres are entirely preventable. A rigorous hot work permit system with pre-job atmospheric testing closes this pathway.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures — degraded equipment, missed inspections, deferred repairs — contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements that gaps here violated.
Supporting documents in our library →
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