FCC Unit Explosion — Transient Operations Air Ingress
Husky Energy Superior Refinery Explosion and Fire
Husky Energy (now Cenovus Superior Refinery)
📍 Superior, WI
Incident: April 26, 2018  •  CSB Report: December 29, 2022
0
Fatalities
Hydrocarbon Vapors — FCC Absorber Sections
Chemical / Hazard
16
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On April 26, 2018, an explosion and fire at the Husky Energy Superior Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin, injured 36 workers and caused approximately $550 million in damage. The incident occurred during a planned FCC unit turnaround shutdown when air entered the gas concentration unit through the regenerator, mixing with trapped hydrocarbon vapors in the primary and sponge absorbers to form flammable mixtures that ignited.

The explosion propelled vessel fragments more than 1,200 feet, triggered an asphalt tank fire that burned for days, and forced the evacuation of approximately 2,500 nearby residents. The CSB found the refinery's shutdown procedures did not address the air ingress hazard and no prior PHA had identified it.

The CSB final report issued 16 recommendations: seven to the Cenovus Superior Refinery, three to Cenovus Energy, three to API, and one each to EPA, OSHA, and Honeywell UOP. They focus on FCC safeguards during transient operation, slide valve mechanical integrity, PHA of transient operations, training, and industry guidance for safe FCC operation.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Air Ingress Hazard Not Identified in PHA
No prior process hazard analysis identified the hazard of air entering the gas concentration unit hydrocarbon sections during FCC shutdown depressurization — a known industry hazard was missed entirely.
Finding 02
Shutdown Procedures Lacked Air Ingress Controls
Written FCC shutdown procedures did not include steps to prevent or detect air ingress into the absorber vessels, leaving workers without guidance for this critical transient hazard.
Finding 03
Flammable Mixture Formed in Absorber Vessels
During depressurization, air migrated from the regenerator into the primary and sponge absorbers, mixing with residual hydrocarbons to form flammable vapor/air mixtures that ignited.
Finding 04
Explosion Propelled Fragments 1,200+ Feet
The explosion ejected vessel fragments at extreme velocities — one large fragment landed over 1,200 feet away, starting the asphalt tank fire and creating shrapnel hazards across the surrounding community.
Finding 05
No Safe Work Practices for Transient Operations
The refinery lacked documented safe work practices specifically addressing the unique hazards of FCC unit startup, shutdown, and other non-routine operating modes.
Finding 06
2,500 Residents Evacuated Due to Asphalt Tank Fire
The post-explosion asphalt tank fire burned for several days, forcing evacuation of approximately 2,500 residents — demonstrating that refinery process safety failures carry significant off-site community consequences.
🔍 Root Causes
1
PHA Failed to Identify Transient Operations Hazards
The facility's PHA methodology did not adequately evaluate non-routine, transient FCC operating conditions — leaving the air ingress hazard unrecognized and unmitigated.
2
Procedures Not Developed for Shutdown Hazards
MOC and procedure development processes did not ensure transient hazards were captured in written safeguards — the air ingress hazard was never reflected in procedures even after PHAs were conducted.
3
Industry and Regulatory Gap for Transient Operations
Neither OSHA PSM nor API standards adequately required hazard analysis covering FCC transient operating modes — allowing a known hazard to persist industry-wide.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Establish safeguards to prevent FCC explosions during transient operation, including a reactor steam barrier, main column purging and oxygen monitoring, monitoring of critical parameters, and documented consequences of deviation, built into procedures and training. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Based on licensor input and good practice, determine when to shut down the wet gas compressors during FCC shutdown, and add this to procedures and training. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Develop and implement a slide valve mechanical integrity program addressing erosion and proper function during shutdown, and demonstrate its adequacy at the next major turnaround. [Open]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Develop emergency procedures for responding to loss of catalyst slide valve function. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Develop guidance for analyzing operating procedures to improve transient operation hazard evaluations during PHAs. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Develop and implement an FCC training program for operators, supervisors, and managers, including transient operations, industry incident case studies, and simulator training. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Superior Refinery
Add lessons learned to Emergency Response Team training, including response to liquids stored above their flash point (such as asphalt) and pyrophoric material in asphalt tanks. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Energy (Corporate)
Develop FCC-specific PHA guidance for all Cenovus refineries with FCC units. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Energy (Corporate)
Develop a technology-specific knowledge-sharing network across Cenovus refineries, including an FCC peer network that meets at least annually. [Closed]
→ Cenovus Energy (Corporate)
Include and maintain FCC licensors' operating manuals in process safety information for all FCC units. [Closed]
→ API
Develop a publicly available technical publication for safe operation of FCC units, covering hazards, safeguards, transient operation monitoring, emergency procedures, PHA guidance, and training. (AFPM implemented this on API's behalf.) [Closed]
→ API
Modify the appropriate recommended practice (such as API RP 553) to cover the purpose, design, maintenance, and testing of FCC catalyst slide valve components. [Closed]
→ API
Incorporate lessons from this incident into API products on heated asphalt storage and tank fires, including the ignition risk of pyrophoric material. [Closed]
→ EPA
Develop a program prioritizing inspections of FCC units at refineries that operate HF alkylation units, verifying FCC safeguards for transient operation. [Open]
→ OSHA
Develop guidance documents for performing PHA on operating procedures to address transient operation hazards at PSM-covered facilities. [Open]
→ Honeywell UOP
Participate in the API committee developing a technical publication for safe operation of FCC units. [Closed]

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Transient operating modes — startup, shutdown, emergency operations — often involve hazardous conditions not present during normal operation. PHAs must explicitly scope and analyze these modes, not just steady-state.
An FCC unit shutdown procedure that does not address air ingress has a critical gap that can turn a routine turnaround into a catastrophe. Procedures must be built for the specific hazards of each operating mode.
Air ingress into FCC hydrocarbon sections during shutdown is a known industry hazard. Failure to identify it in a PHA is a systemic failure of hazard recognition — not just a procedural gap.
Vessel fragments from process explosions can travel over 1,000 feet. Consequence modeling must consider fragment throw distances and potential community impacts, not just on-site blast radius.
Refinery incidents can force the evacuation of thousands of community members. Emergency response planning must include coordination with local authorities for large-scale off-site consequences.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresTRN: TrainingMI: Mechanical Integrity
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Does our facility's PHA scope explicitly include startup, shutdown, and emergency operating modes — or only steady-state operations?
►Can you identify a unit or process at our facility where shutdown or startup creates hazardous conditions not present during normal operation?
►When were our shutdown procedures last reviewed to verify they address all hazards specific to those transient operating modes?
►If our process introduced air into a hydrocarbon system during shutdown, would our procedures tell operators what to do?
►How do we ensure lessons learned from incidents at other facilities get incorporated into our own procedures and PHAs?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review your facility's PHA methodology to confirm it explicitly requires analysis of transient operating modes (startup, shutdown, emergency) — update if it does not.
✓Pull the last PHA report for one major unit and check whether startup and shutdown scenarios were analyzed; document any gaps and initiate action items.
✓Identify the three most hazardous transient operating modes at your facility and verify that written procedures specifically address those hazards.
✓Brief your operations team on the Husky Superior FCC air ingress mechanism and ask them to identify analogous risks in your own processes.
✓Confirm your emergency response plan includes coordination protocols with local authorities for large-scale incidents with potential off-site consequences.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident traced to breakdowns across 4 PSM elements (PHA · SOP · TRN · MI). Each represents a documented gap that process safety documentation and consulting can close before a similar event occurs at your facility.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions — a root cause here — is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements that gaps here violated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures — degraded equipment, missed inspections, deferred repairs — contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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