Hot Work — Flash Fire and Explosion in Piping
Sunoco Partners Nederland Terminal Flash Fire and Explosion
Sunoco Partners — Nederland Terminal (contractor L-Con, Inc.)
📍 Nederland, TX
Incident: August 12, 2016 • CSB Report: September 2022
0
Fatalities
7
Workers Injured
Residual Crude Oil in a Piping Segment
Chemical / Hazard
See report
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

At about 8:15 p.m. on August 12, 2016, contractor L-Con, Inc. was welding on a piping segment at the Sunoco Partners crude oil terminal in Nederland, Texas, when residual crude oil in the pipe ignited.

The flash fire and explosion overpressured the pipe segment. CARBER isolation tools that had been installed for the project, along with residual crude oil, were ejected from both ends of the piping, causing impact and burn injuries to seven workers. The effects were localized and did not reach offsite.

The CSB identified hot work safety as the key issue: the piping had not been cleared of flammable material or inerted before welding, as OSHA requires to prevent explosive atmospheres inside enclosed equipment. The final report was adopted in September 2022.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Pipe Not Cleared or Inerted
The piping section was not cleared of flammable material or inerted before welding.
Finding 02
Explosive Atmosphere Inside Equipment
Welding on equipment containing an explosive atmosphere provided the ignition source.
Finding 03
Isolation Tools Ejected
Overpressure inside the pipe ejected the CARBER isolation tools and residual crude from the pipe ends.
Finding 04
Permit Controls Did Not Address the Inside of the Pipe
The hot work permit required a fire watch, extinguisher, and continuous gas monitor, but these did not address the explosive atmosphere inside the pipe.
Finding 05
Policies Not Effectively Implemented
The CSB said ineffective implementation and execution of policies and procedures by Sunoco, L-Con, and CARBER contributed to the incident.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Hot work on uncleared equipment
Welding took place on piping that still held flammable material.
2
Hazard inside the equipment not evaluated
Controls focused on the external area rather than the inside of the pipe.
3
Multi-party execution gaps
Owner and contractors did not effectively carry out their policies.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ See the CSB report
Refer to the CSB investigation report for its findings and any recommendations.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Before hot work on piping or vessels, clear and inert the equipment or verify it is free of flammables inside.
Gas monitoring outside a pipe says nothing about the atmosphere inside it.
Isolation tools can become projectiles if the pipe overpressures.
Owners and contractors share responsibility for hot work controls.
HW: Hot WorkCON: ContractorsSOP: Operating ProceduresPSI: Process Safety Information
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►How do we verify the inside of equipment is free of flammables before hot work?
►When do we require inerting?
►Where would isolation plugs go if the pipe overpressured?
►Who checks that contractor hot work steps are followed?
Immediate Action Items
✓Add internal atmosphere verification to hot work permits on piping and vessels.
✓Require clearing or inerting before welding on equipment that held hydrocarbons.
✓Review placement and restraint of pipe isolation tools during hot work.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (HW · CON · SOP · PSI). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Hot Work Permits
Hot work near flammable materials requires a permit, gas testing, and control of nearby hazards before any cutting or welding begins.
Supporting documents in our library →
Contractors
Contractors must know the process hazards, and their safety performance must be part of how they are selected and overseen.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
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