Reactive Chemicals — Hydrogen Release
AB Specialty Silicones Explosion and Fire
AB Specialty Silicones, LLC
📍 Waukegan, IL
Incident: May 3, 2019 • CSB Report: September 24, 2021
4
Fatalities
1
Seriously Injured
Hydrogen Gas (from Incompatible Chemical Mixing in a Batch Reactor)
Chemical / Hazard
3
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On May 3, 2019, a massive explosion and fire at the AB Specialty Silicones (ABSS) facility in Waukegan, Illinois, killed four workers, seriously injured another, and caused extensive damage to nearby businesses.

The facility was making EM 652, a silicon hydride emulsion used as a water repellent. Both the product and one of its raw materials, XL10, can produce hydrogen gas under certain conditions. The CSB concluded that the explosion resulted from the ignition of hydrogen released during a process upset that occurred while incompatible chemicals were being mixed in a batch reactor vessel.

The CSB found deficiencies in ABSS's hazard analysis program, its methods for storing and handling incompatible materials, its procedures, its process safety culture, and the lack of a safety management system addressing process safety. Batch equipment and ventilation design, the lack of a gas detection and alarm system, and ineffective emergency preparedness contributed to the severity. The CSB issued 3 recommendations to ABSS; all are closed.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Incompatible Chemicals Mixed in a Batch Reactor
The process upset occurred while incompatible materials were mixed in a batch reactor vessel, generating hydrogen gas that was released into the production building.
Finding 02
Product and Raw Material Could Generate Hydrogen
EM 652 and its raw material XL10 can both produce hydrogen under certain conditions, a reactive hazard that had to be managed in storage, handling, and processing.
Finding 03
Storage and Handling of Incompatibles Was Inadequate
The CSB identified the way ABSS stored and handled incompatible materials as a safety issue that contributed to the mixing event.
Finding 04
No Gas Detection and Alarm System
There was no hydrogen detection and alarm system to warn workers that a flammable gas was being released inside the building.
Finding 05
Equipment, Ventilation, and Emergency Preparedness Increased Severity
Batch equipment and ventilation design and ineffective emergency preparedness contributed to the severity of the incident.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Weak hazard analysis program
ABSS's hazard analysis did not effectively identify and control the reactive hazards of mixing incompatible materials.
2
No process safety management system
The facility lacked a safety management system that addressed process safety, and the CSB noted weaknesses in process safety culture.
3
Reactive hazards outside regulatory coverage
The CSB listed regulatory coverage of reactive hazards as a safety issue, a gap it has raised with OSHA and EPA in earlier investigations.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ AB Specialty Silicones (R1, closed)
Develop hazardous gas detection and alarm programs, based on manufacturer specifications, codes, standards, and good practice, for all hazardous gases that could be released near workers, including hydrogen; keep the systems functional at all times.
→ AB Specialty Silicones (R2, closed)
Establish a safety management system that addresses process safety at the Waukegan facility, using CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety and Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management.
→ AB Specialty Silicones (R3, closed)
Incorporate the ten elements of CCPS Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, from collecting reactivity data and testing to training, incident investigation, and management of change.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Know every way your materials can react, including with each other. A raw material or product that can release hydrogen needs controls in storage, handling, and processing.
Incompatible materials need physical and procedural separation, not just labels and memory.
Gas detection with alarms gives workers time to leave before a flammable atmosphere ignites.
Emergency preparedness has to cover reactive releases inside buildings, not only fires and spills.
PSI: Process Safety InformationPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Which of our materials can generate a flammable or toxic gas if mixed with something else?
►How are incompatible materials stored and kept apart here?
►Do we have gas detection where a reactive release could occur indoors?
►What would we do in the first minute if a batch started to behave abnormally?
Immediate Action Items
✓Build or update a chemical compatibility chart for every material in the batch area.
✓Verify gas detection and alarm coverage for hydrogen and other gases that could be released.
✓Run an emergency drill for an abnormal batch reaction with gas release.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PSI · PHA · SOP · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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