Midland Resource Recovery (MRR) decommissioned obsolete natural gas odorizer equipment and brought it to its Philippi, West Virginia, site to remove the mercaptan odor before the steel was scrapped. The treatment involved filling the odorizers with diluted sodium hypochlorite (bleach) and sealing them for a period of time.
On May 24, 2017, two workers and the company owner attempted to unseal and drain one of the treated odorizers when it exploded, fatally injuring one worker and the owner and severely injuring the second worker. On June 20, 2017, while the CSB was investigating, a contractor hired to investigate and drain the remaining odorizers was fatally injured when a second odorizer exploded shortly after it was unsealed.
The CSB could not determine exactly what chemicals were in the odorizers before treatment, but concluded that dangerous reactions occurred inside both vessels. One possibility is that methanol reacted with sodium hypochlorite to form highly explosive methyl hypochlorite. The CSB found that MRR lacked an effective safety management system to identify and control reactive chemical hazards. The CSB issued key lessons, not formal recommendations, in this report.
Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.
This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (PSI · PHA · SOP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.