Reactive Chemicals — Odorizer Explosions
Midland Resource Recovery Explosions
Midland Resource Recovery (MRR)
📍 Philippi (Barbour County), WV
Incident: May 24, 2017 • CSB Report: December 17, 2019
3
Fatalities
1
Severely Injured
Sodium Hypochlorite + Unknown Odorant Residues (Possible Methyl Hypochlorite)
Chemical / Hazard
0
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

Midland Resource Recovery (MRR) decommissioned obsolete natural gas odorizer equipment and brought it to its Philippi, West Virginia, site to remove the mercaptan odor before the steel was scrapped. The treatment involved filling the odorizers with diluted sodium hypochlorite (bleach) and sealing them for a period of time.

On May 24, 2017, two workers and the company owner attempted to unseal and drain one of the treated odorizers when it exploded, fatally injuring one worker and the owner and severely injuring the second worker. On June 20, 2017, while the CSB was investigating, a contractor hired to investigate and drain the remaining odorizers was fatally injured when a second odorizer exploded shortly after it was unsealed.

The CSB could not determine exactly what chemicals were in the odorizers before treatment, but concluded that dangerous reactions occurred inside both vessels. One possibility is that methanol reacted with sodium hypochlorite to form highly explosive methyl hypochlorite. The CSB found that MRR lacked an effective safety management system to identify and control reactive chemical hazards. The CSB issued key lessons, not formal recommendations, in this report.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Unknown Contents Treated with Bleach
Odorizers containing unknown liquid chemicals were filled with sodium hypochlorite and sealed tight. The CSB said each treated odorizer was essentially a bomb.
Finding 02
Two Explosions, Three Deaths
The first explosion on May 24, 2017 killed a worker and the company owner and severely injured another worker. The second, on June 20, 2017, killed a contractor.
Finding 03
Possible Methyl Hypochlorite Formation
One possible explanation is that methanol reacted with sodium hypochlorite to form highly explosive methyl hypochlorite.
Finding 04
No Hazard Identification Before Treatment
MRR had no formal process to analyze or characterize what chemicals were in the odorizers, and in what quantity, before decommissioning and treatment.
Finding 05
No Safeguards Against Uncontrolled Reactions
MRR lacked effective safeguards to prevent unexpected or uncontrolled chemical reactions.
🔍 Root Causes
1
No safety management system for reactive chemistry
MRR did not have, and federal regulations did not require, a comprehensive system to identify and control reactive chemical hazards.
2
Uncharacterized materials
Waste and residues were treated without knowing their composition.
3
Regulatory gap
The CSB noted that OSHA and EPA had not acted on its long-standing recommendations to cover reactive hazards.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ No formal recommendations
The CSB's December 2019 report issued key lessons: companies with potential for uncontrolled reactions should formally evaluate the reactive chemistry, perform a hazard analysis, and ensure sufficient safeguards; and they should understand their chemistry under normal and foreseeable abnormal conditions, avoiding treatment of uncharacterized waste with sodium hypochlorite.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Never treat or mix materials whose composition you do not know.
Sodium hypochlorite chemistry is complex and can produce explosive compounds with some organics, such as methanol.
Sealing a vessel during a reaction can turn it into a pressure hazard.
After an incident, the remaining equipment carries the same hazard until it is understood. Restart and cleanup work need hazard review too.
PSI: Process Safety InformationPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating Procedures
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Do we ever treat, neutralize, or clean equipment that contains unknown residues?
►Who reviews the chemistry before a new treatment or cleaning method is used?
►How do we control the hazard of opening a sealed vessel that may be under pressure?
►After an incident, how do we decide whether similar equipment is safe to handle?
Immediate Action Items
✓Require characterization of residues before any chemical treatment or cleaning.
✓Add reactive chemistry review to the approval of new treatment methods.
✓Establish a procedure for opening sealed vessels that may be pressurized.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (PSI · PHA · SOP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Management Consulting & Document Library
📂
PSM Document Library
72 ready-to-deploy PSM documents covering all 14 OSHA elements — procedures, checklists, and audit templates built for facilities operating under 29 CFR 1910.119.
Browse the Library →
📊
Free PSM Health Score
Find out where your PSM program stands across all 14 OSHA elements. Our free health score surfaces your biggest gaps in under 10 minutes — no account required.
Check Your Score →
📞
Consulting Services
PHA facilitation, PSM program builds, compliance audits, and OSHA inspection support. Scoped per project with a written proposal before work begins — no retainer required to get started.
View Pricing →
📋 Explore the full incident library: All 111 CSB Case Studies →