On October 21, 2016, a chemical delivery truck operated by Harcros Chemicals was inadvertently connected to the wrong chemical tank at the MGPI Processing facility in Atchison, Kansas. Instead of connecting to the sulfuric acid storage tank, the driver connected to a tank containing sodium hypochlorite. The reaction between sulfuric acid and sodium hypochlorite generated a toxic chlorine gas plume that spread into the surrounding community, triggering a shelter-in-place order for thousands of residents. At least 120 employees and members of the public sought medical attention.
The CSB investigation found that MGPI's chemical transfer equipment lacked adequate engineering safeguards to prevent connection of incompatible chemicals, that no physical barriers distinguished one tank connection from another, and that Harcros Chemicals drivers lacked refresher training on emergency shutdown procedures and respiratory protection for inadvertent chemical mixing scenarios.
The January 2018 CSB case study issued 5 recommendations to MGPI Processing, Harcros Chemicals, and the Atchison County Department of Emergency Management -- addressing interlock safeguards against incompatible chemical mixing, ventilation engineering controls, driver emergency training, and local emergency planning committee preparedness.
This incident traced to breakdowns across 3 PSM elements (SOP · MI · EAP). Each represents a documented gap that process safety documentation and consulting can close before a similar event occurs at your facility.