Refinery Fire — Maintenance on Plug Valve
ExxonMobil Baton Rouge Refinery Chemical Release and Fire
ExxonMobil Corporation
📍 Baton Rouge, LA
Incident: November 22, 2016 • CSB Report: September 18, 2017 (Safety Bulletin)
0
Fatalities
6
Injured (4 seriously)
Isobutane (Sulfuric Acid Alkylation Unit)
Chemical / Hazard
0
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On November 22, 2016, an isobutane release and fire in the sulfuric acid alkylation unit at the ExxonMobil refinery in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, seriously injured four workers and injured two others.

Operators were removing an inoperable gearbox from a plug valve. During this maintenance they inadvertently removed bolts that secured a piece of pressure-containing equipment to the valve. When they attempted to open the plug valve, it came apart and released flammable hydrocarbons, which formed a vapor cloud that quickly ignited.

About 97% of the valves in the unit had been updated to a safer design. The CSB concluded that updating all of the older valves would have prevented the incident. It also found a refinery culture that accepted operators performing maintenance on malfunctioning plug valve gearboxes without written procedures or adequate training. The CSB issued a safety bulletin with key lessons rather than formal recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Bolts Holding Pressure Equipment Were Removed
While removing the gearbox, operators removed bolts that secured pressure-containing equipment to the plug valve.
Finding 02
Valve Came Apart When Opened
When the operators tried to open the plug valve, it came apart and released isobutane, which ignited.
Finding 03
Older Valve Design Remained in Service
About 97% of the unit's valves had been converted to the safer design. Updating the rest would have prevented the incident.
Finding 04
No Written Procedure or Training
Operators routinely worked on malfunctioning gearboxes without written procedures or adequate training.
Finding 05
Warning Sign Is a Weak Safeguard
The CSB noted that an engineering control such as improved valve design is more effective than an administrative control such as a warning sign about the gearbox bracket.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Hazard not analyzed
An accepted maintenance practice was performed without appropriate hazard analysis.
2
Hierarchy of controls not applied
The engineering fix, replacing the older valves, was not completed for every valve.
3
Procedures and training missing
Workers had no written procedure for removing an inoperable gearbox.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ No formal recommendations
The CSB safety bulletin issued key lessons: evaluate human factors associated with operational difficulties with equipment, especially in PSM-covered processes, and apply the hierarchy of controls; establish detailed, accurate procedures for potentially hazardous work such as removing an inoperable gearbox; and train workers so they can perform all anticipated tasks safely.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Routine workarounds deserve the same hazard analysis as planned changes.
When an engineering fix exists, finishing it beats relying on signs and memory.
Know which bolts hold pressure before you remove any of them.
Every anticipated job, including fixing a stuck valve, needs a written procedure and training.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresTRN: TrainingMI: Mechanical Integrity
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Are there jobs here that operators do routinely without a written procedure?
►Do we still have older equipment designs that the rest of the unit has moved away from?
►How do we know which fasteners on a valve are pressure-retaining?
►When was the last time we reviewed a workaround for hazards?
Immediate Action Items
✓Inventory valves and equipment still in older or less safe designs and set a replacement plan.
✓Write procedures for recurring field maintenance tasks such as gearbox removal.
✓Train operators to identify pressure-retaining components before maintenance.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PHA · SOP · TRN · MI). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
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Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
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Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements.
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Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
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