Refinery Flash Fire — Equipment Preparation
Delaware City Refining Company — Equipment Preparation for Maintenance
Delaware City Refining Company (DCRC)
📍 Delaware City, DE
Incident: November 29, 2015 • CSB Report: May 18, 2017 (Safety Bulletin)
0
Fatalities
1
Operator Burned
Flammable Hydrocarbons (Alkylation Unit)
Chemical / Hazard
0
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On November 29, 2015, alkylation unit operators at the Delaware City Refining Company (DCRC) were preparing equipment for maintenance. They had to drain and isolate a section of piping scheduled for replacement by closing valves to block hydrocarbon flow.

A valve on one side of the isolation was leaking and would not seal, so the isolation was expanded to a downstream block valve. That expansion did not trigger additional hazard review, and it brought in additional equipment that had to be drained. Shortly after the nightshift operator opened a drain valve to the sewer system, he heard a pop and saw a wall of fire advancing toward him. He suffered second- and third-degree burns.

The CSB found the work was non-routine and that DCRC had no general procedures for preparing equipment for maintenance or taking it out of service. This incident followed two other incidents at the same facility on August 21 and August 28, 2015. The CSB issued a safety bulletin with five key lessons rather than formal recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Leaking Valve Forced a Larger Isolation
Because one isolation valve leaked, the boundary was moved to a downstream block valve, adding equipment that needed to be drained.
Finding 02
Change Was Not Reviewed
Expanding the isolation did not trigger an additional hazard review.
Finding 03
Draining to the Sewer
The flash fire occurred shortly after the operator opened a drain valve to the sewer system.
Finding 04
No Equipment Preparation Procedures
DCRC did not have general procedures for preparing equipment for maintenance or for taking equipment out of service.
Finding 05
Third Incident in 2015
The November incident followed incidents at the same facility on August 21 and August 28, 2015.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Non-routine work without procedures
Equipment preparation tasks were done without written procedures.
2
Changing conditions not evaluated
The expanded isolation plan was not checked for new hazards.
3
Open drainage of hydrocarbons
Draining to the sewer rather than a closed system allowed flammable material to be released where it could ignite.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ No formal recommendations
The CSB safety bulletin issued five key lessons: have procedures for non-routine tasks such as emptying, decontaminating, washing, steaming, purging, and draining; require preplanning and hazard identification for all equipment preparation; avoid reliance on single block valves and consider double blocks or blinds; evaluate the hazard when an isolation plan is modified or expanded; and use closed systems to control draining and relieving of hazardous energy.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Equipment preparation is often non-routine work and needs written procedures.
When a leaking valve changes the isolation plan, stop and evaluate the new hazards.
Single block valves are a weak isolation. Double blocks or blinds give more protection.
Drain hydrocarbons to closed systems, not to open sewers.
SOP: Operating ProceduresPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMOC: Management of Change
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Do we have written procedures for draining, purging, and steaming equipment before maintenance?
►What happens here when an isolation valve will not seal?
►Where do we drain hydrocarbons when preparing equipment?
►Do we rely on single block valves for maintenance isolation?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review equipment preparation procedures against the five CSB key lessons.
✓Require a hazard review whenever an isolation plan is changed in the field.
✓Identify drain points that route hydrocarbons to open sewers and plan closed-system alternatives.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (SOP · PHA · MOC). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
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Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
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