On November 29, 2015, alkylation unit operators at the Delaware City Refining Company (DCRC) were preparing equipment for maintenance. They had to drain and isolate a section of piping scheduled for replacement by closing valves to block hydrocarbon flow.
A valve on one side of the isolation was leaking and would not seal, so the isolation was expanded to a downstream block valve. That expansion did not trigger additional hazard review, and it brought in additional equipment that had to be drained. Shortly after the nightshift operator opened a drain valve to the sewer system, he heard a pop and saw a wall of fire advancing toward him. He suffered second- and third-degree burns.
The CSB found the work was non-routine and that DCRC had no general procedures for preparing equipment for maintenance or taking it out of service. This incident followed two other incidents at the same facility on August 21 and August 28, 2015. The CSB issued a safety bulletin with five key lessons rather than formal recommendations.
Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.
This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (SOP · PHA · MOC). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.