High Temperature Hydrogen Attack — Heat Exchanger Rupture
Tesoro Anacortes Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire
Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company — Anacortes Refinery
📍 Anacortes, WA
Incident: April 2, 2010 • CSB Report: May 1, 2014
7
Fatalities
3+ hrs
Fire Duration
Hydrogen and Naphtha above 500°F (Naphtha Hydrotreater Heat Exchanger)
Chemical / Hazard
16
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On April 2, 2010, a nearly 40-year-old heat exchanger in the naphtha hydrotreater unit at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington, catastrophically ruptured during a non-routine operation to switch a process stream between two parallel banks of exchangers. Hydrogen and naphtha above 500°F were released and ignited, causing an explosion and a fire that burned for more than three hours. Seven employees were killed.

The CSB found that the carbon steel exchanger failed from High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA), which severely cracked and weakened the steel. A CSB reconstruction of process conditions found that the failed portion likely operated below the applicable API RP 941 Nelson curve, which indicated it was safe. The CSB concluded the Nelson curves were unreliable and that inspection cannot reliably detect HTHA damage.

The startup was hazardous non-routine work with a history of flammable leaks. Because of recurring leaks and valves that took more than a hundred turns to open, a supervisor called in five additional workers to help, and all seven died. The CSB cited a complacent safety culture toward leaks and fires, PHAs that relied on judgment-based safeguards, and the failure to use HTHA-resistant materials. The final report, approved May 1, 2014, made 16 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
HTHA Ruptured a Carbon Steel Exchanger
High Temperature Hydrogen Attack severely cracked and weakened the carbon steel exchanger, leading to its rupture.
Finding 02
The Nelson Curve Was Unreliable
The failed portion of the exchanger likely operated below the carbon steel Nelson curve. Tesoro relied on design operating conditions rather than verifying actual conditions.
Finding 03
Inspection Could Not Be Relied On
HTHA cracks can be microscopic and localized, making inspection an unreliable safeguard. The CSB concluded inherently safer materials, such as higher-chromium steels, are the better approach.
Finding 04
Too Many People Exposed During Non-Routine Work
Tesoro did not limit the number of people involved in the hazardous startup of the exchanger bank; five additional workers were called in to help.
Finding 05
Weak PHAs and Safety Culture
PHAs repeatedly failed to ensure leak hazards were controlled and cited judgment-based safeguards without verifying their effectiveness. The CSB described a culture that required proof of danger rather than proof of safety.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Material not resistant to HTHA
Carbon steel was used in hydrogen service where HTHA-resistant alloys were available.
2
Reliance on design conditions and the Nelson curve
Actual operating conditions were not verified, and the industry curve did not predict the failure.
3
Hazardous non-routine work not controlled
Recurring leaks were normalized and the number of workers exposed was not minimized.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ U.S. EPA (4)
Require documented inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls under the RMP rule, enforce it under the General Duty Clause in the interim, develop guidance, and participate in a Tesoro safety culture oversight committee.
→ Governor and Legislature of Washington (3)
Strengthen refinery process safety regulation with goal-setting attributes such as damage mechanism hazard reviews and inherently safer systems analysis, establish a well-funded and technically qualified regulator, and develop a process safety indicators program.
→ Washington L&I — DOSH (2)
Perform verification audits at all Washington refineries covering HTHA prevention, hazard evaluation of non-routine work, and limiting personnel during hazardous non-routine work, and participate in the safety culture oversight committee.
→ American Petroleum Institute (2)
Revise API RP 941 and RP 581 with minimum requirements to prevent HTHA, including verifying actual operating conditions and prohibiting carbon steel above 400°F and 50 psia hydrogen partial pressure. (Closed as unacceptable.)
→ Tesoro (4) and USW Local 12-591 (1)
Participate in API's revision and implement its requirements, improve PHA, integrity operating window, and damage mechanism hazard review programs across all Tesoro refineries, and implement a process safety culture improvement program with periodic surveys overseen by a committee including the union.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Do not rely on a single industry curve for HTHA; verify actual operating conditions and use resistant materials.
Recurring leaks are warning signs, not normal operations.
Limit the number of people exposed during hazardous non-routine work.
PHA safeguards should be verified as effective, not assumed.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresPSI: Process Safety Information
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Do we have carbon steel equipment in hot hydrogen service?
►Are our equipment limits based on actual or design operating conditions?
►How many people are present during our non-routine startups?
►Are leaks during startup treated as normal?
Immediate Action Items
✓Inventory carbon steel equipment in hydrogen service and verify actual operating conditions.
✓Review non-routine work procedures to limit personnel.
✓Audit PHA safeguards for verified effectiveness.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · PHA · SOP · PSI). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
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