Reboiler Rupture — BLEVE and Fire
Williams Olefins Plant Explosion and Fire
Williams Olefins, L.L.C. — Geismar Olefins Plant
📍 Geismar, LA
Incident: June 13, 2013 • CSB Report: October 19, 2016
2
Fatalities
167
Reported Injuries
Liquid Propane Mixture (Propylene Fractionator Reboiler)
Chemical / Hazard
5
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On June 13, 2013, a reboiler at the Williams Olefins plant in Geismar, Louisiana, ruptured, causing a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) and fire. Two workers were killed and 167 others reported injuries, most of them contractors. About 800 contractors were working at the plant on an expansion project at the time.

During non-routine operating activities, heat was introduced to a standby reboiler that was offline and isolated from its pressure relief device. The heat raised the temperature of a liquid propane mixture confined in the reboiler, and the pressure rose until the shell catastrophically ruptured.

The CSB concluded that process safety management deficiencies over the 12 years before the incident left the reboiler unprotected from overpressure. It cited a poor process safety culture and weaknesses in Management of Change, Pre-Startup Safety Review, Process Hazard Analysis, and procedures. The final report, released October 19, 2016, made 5 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Block Valves Could Isolate the Reboiler from Relief
Block valves had been installed that could isolate the reboiler from its pressure relief device. This change was not appropriately managed or effectively reviewed.
Finding 02
Administrative Controls Were Not Effectively Reviewed
Williams relied on administrative controls to keep the block valves in the correct position. That change was also not effectively managed or reviewed; a delayed MOC did not identify the major overpressure hazard.
Finding 03
PHA Recommendation Not Completed Effectively
A key hazard analysis recommendation intended to protect the reboiler was not effectively completed.
Finding 04
No Hazard Analysis or Procedure for the Day's Activity
There was no hazard analysis or written procedure for the non-routine activities performed on the day of the incident that could have addressed overpressure protection.
Finding 05
Weak Process Safety Culture
The CSB found that a weak process safety culture contributed to the delayed MOC that missed the hazard and to an incomplete PSSR.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Overpressure protection defeated
The reboiler could be isolated from its relief device, and a locked-open valve was relied on instead of a dedicated relief valve.
2
MOC, PSSR, and PHA weaknesses
Changes that introduced new hazards were not effectively reviewed, and a PHA recommendation was not completed.
3
Non-routine work without a procedure
Heat was added to an isolated, liquid-filled vessel without a hazard review or procedure.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Williams Geismar Olefins Facility (3)
Implement a process safety culture continual improvement program with periodic independent culture assessments and workforce involvement; develop a process safety metrics program tracking MOC, PSSR, action item completion, and procedures; and conduct independent assessments of MOC, PSSR, PHA, and operating procedure programs at least every three years.
→ American Petroleum Institute (2)
Strengthen API Standard 521 by defining equipment operating statuses such as standby and out-of-service with relief requirements for each, and require a pressure relief device for overpressure scenarios, including hydraulic expansion, rather than allowing administrative controls alone.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Apply the hierarchy of controls: a relief valve on the reboiler is more reliable than relying on a locked-open block valve.
Any valve that can isolate equipment from its relief device is a change that needs a thorough MOC and hazard review.
PHA recommendations only protect people when they are completed effectively.
Non-routine operations need a hazard review and a written procedure.
MOC: Management of ChangePSSR: Pre-Startup Safety ReviewPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating Procedures
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Can any of our equipment be isolated from its pressure relief device?
►How do we control the position of car-sealed or locked-open valves?
►Are there open PHA recommendations on overpressure protection?
►Do we have procedures for non-routine operations like switching standby equipment?
Immediate Action Items
✓Identify equipment that can be blocked in from its relief device and review its protection.
✓Audit open PHA action items related to overpressure.
✓Require a hazard review and written procedure before non-routine operations.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MOC · PSSR · PHA · SOP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
New or modified equipment must be confirmed safe, built as designed, and covered by procedures and training before hazardous materials are introduced.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
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