Refinery Flash Fire and Pipe Rupture — Two Incidents
Silver Eagle Refinery Flash Fire and Catastrophic Pipe Explosion
Silver Eagle Refining
📍 Woods Cross, UT
Incident: January 12 and November 4, 2009 • CSB Report: April 14, 2014 (technical report)
0
Fatalities
4
Seriously Burned (Jan. 2009)
Light Naphtha Vapor (Tank 105); Hydrogen (10-inch Pipe Rupture)
Chemical / Hazard
0
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

The Silver Eagle Refinery in Woods Cross, Utah, had two serious accidents in 2009. On the evening of January 12, 2009, a large flammable vapor cloud was released from an atmospheric storage tank, Tank 105, which held an estimated 440,000 gallons of light naphtha. The cloud found an ignition source, and the flash fire spread up to 230 feet west of the tank farm. Two refinery operators and two contractors were seriously burned.

On November 4, 2009, a 10-inch pipe failed, and the resulting blast wave damaged nearby homes. The CSB's metallurgical analysis, released in April 2014, found that the pipe walls had thinned from corrosion that went uninspected for years before the rupture and hydrogen blast.

The CSB issued a technical report on April 14, 2014, and formally closed the investigation at a public meeting on January 28, 2015. It issued no formal recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Flash Fire from a Naphtha Storage Tank
In January 2009, a large flammable vapor cloud released from Tank 105, containing about 440,000 gallons of light naphtha, ignited and spread up to 230 feet, seriously burning four workers.
Finding 02
Pipe Rupture Damaged Nearby Homes
In November 2009, a 10-inch pipe failed and the blast wave damaged homes near the refinery.
Finding 03
Corrosion Went Uninspected for Years
The CSB's metallurgical analysis found that the pipe wall had thinned from corrosion that was not inspected for years.
Finding 04
Two Serious Incidents in One Year
Two significant events occurred at the same refinery within ten months.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Loss of containment from a storage tank
A flammable vapor cloud from Tank 105 reached an ignition source.
2
Corrosion not found by inspection
The ruptured pipe had thinned over years without inspection.
3
Community exposure
The refinery's proximity to homes meant a piping failure caused offsite damage.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ No formal recommendations
The CSB released a technical report and metallurgical analysis on April 14, 2014, and closed the investigation on January 28, 2015, without issuing recommendations.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Piping in corrosive service needs inspection based on its damage mechanisms; corrosion that is never measured cannot be managed.
Storage tanks of volatile products can release vapor clouds large enough to reach distant ignition sources.
A refinery close to homes must plan for offsite consequences of piping failures.
Two serious events in one year is a signal to examine the whole process safety program.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►When was each of our high-risk piping circuits last thickness-tested?
►Could a tank release reach an ignition source 200 feet away?
►What homes or businesses would a blast wave from our site reach?
►What did we change after our last serious incident?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review piping inspection records for overdue circuits.
✓Evaluate ignition source control around tank farms.
✓Update emergency plans for offsite impacts.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (MI · PHA · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
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