Pressure Vessel Rupture — Offsite Fatality
NDK Crystal Explosion with Offsite Fatality
NDK Crystal, Inc. (NDK America)
📍 Belvidere, IL
Incident: December 7, 2009 • CSB Report: November 14, 2013
1
Fatalities
2
Minor Injuries
High-Pressure Vessel Used to Grow Quartz Crystals (Hydrothermal Process)
Chemical / Hazard
8
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On December 7, 2009, a high-pressure vessel used to grow synthetic quartz crystals ruptured at the NDK Crystal plant in Belvidere, Illinois, about 60 miles northwest of Chicago. The explosion launched debris about 300 yards, fatally injuring a member of the public. Two people sustained minor injuries and were treated on site.

The CSB found that the explosion resulted from stress corrosion cracking of the high-pressure vessel. The company had not inspected or tested the vessels, and it did not heed an earlier warning about the risk to the public.

The CSB released its case study on November 14, 2013, with 8 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Stress Corrosion Cracking
The vessel ruptured because of stress corrosion cracking, an environmentally induced damage mechanism.
Finding 02
Vessels Not Inspected or Tested
NDK did not inspect or test the vessels for this damage.
Finding 03
Earlier Warning Not Heeded
The company did not heed an earlier warning about the risk the vessels posed to the public.
Finding 04
Offsite Fatality
Debris traveled about 300 yards and killed a member of the public.
Finding 05
Code Gaps on Material Thickness
The CSB recommended ASME clarify thickness limits for SA-723 steel to ensure proper heat treatment and avoid environmentally induced damage.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Undetected damage mechanism
Stress corrosion cracking developed without inspection to find it.
2
No inspection program
The vessels were not inspected or tested.
3
Facility siting
The consequences of a vessel failure reached beyond the property line.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ American Society of Mechanical Engineers (1)
Revise the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to include material thickness limits for pressure-containing components, including for SA-723 steel, to ensure proper heat treatment and avoid environmentally induced damage.
→ National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (1)
Communicate the case study findings to pressure vessel inspectors in all 50 states.
→ Illinois Office of the State Fire Marshal (2)
Prohibit use of the existing NDK vessels for crystal growing, and ensure the vessel approval process identifies vessels subject to corrosion and that they are regularly inspected.
→ NDK Crystal (4)
For any new facility, use an inherently safer crystal growing process, implement a coating integrity program, perform annual inspections based on API 510, and commission an independent facility siting study. (Closed as no longer applicable.)

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Know the damage mechanisms for every pressure vessel, and inspect for them.
Warnings about risk to the public deserve a documented response.
Facility siting must consider debris and blast effects beyond the fence line.
Inherently safer conditions, such as lower temperature, pressure, or corrosivity, reduce the consequences of failure.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPSI: Process Safety InformationPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Which of our vessels are subject to stress corrosion cracking?
►When were they last inspected?
►How far could fragments travel if one failed?
►Have we received any warnings about risks that we have not closed out?
Immediate Action Items
✓Confirm damage mechanism reviews for high-pressure vessels.
✓Schedule overdue inspections under API 510.
✓Review facility siting for offsite consequences.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · PSI · PHA · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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