Static Ignition — Tank Farm Explosions
Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire
Barton Solvents, Inc.
📍 Valley Center, KS
Incident: July 17, 2007 • CSB Report: June 26, 2008
0
Fatalities
1000s
Residents Evacuated
Static-Accumulating Flammable Liquid (Nonconductive Solvent)
Chemical / Hazard
9
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On July 17, 2007, explosions and fire erupted at the Barton Solvents chemical distribution facility in Valley Center, Kansas, north of Wichita. Thousands of residents were evacuated, projectiles caused damage offsite, and the facility was extensively damaged.

The CSB found that a static spark ignited flammable vapor in a storage tank holding a nonconductive, static-accumulating flammable liquid. The Material Safety Data Sheets did not warn that such liquids can accumulate static and form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in tanks, or that bonding and grounding alone may not be enough to eliminate the hazard.

The CSB's final report, issued June 26, 2008, made 9 recommendations focused on improving MSDS information for nonconductive flammable liquids.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Static Spark Ignited Tank Vapor
A static discharge ignited an ignitable vapor-air mixture inside a storage tank of a static-accumulating flammable liquid.
Finding 02
Bonding and Grounding May Not Be Enough
For static-accumulating liquids, bonding and grounding alone may not eliminate the hazard; additional precautions are described in NFPA 77 and API RP 2003.
Finding 03
MSDSs Lacked Static Hazard Warnings
Safety data sheets did not identify the liquid as a static accumulator or provide conductivity data.
Finding 04
Community Impact
Thousands of residents were evacuated and projectiles caused offsite damage.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Static accumulation
A nonconductive flammable liquid accumulated static charge during tank operations.
2
Ignitable vapor space
The tank's vapor space contained an ignitable mixture.
3
Hazard information gap
The static hazard was not communicated through MSDSs.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ OSHA (2)
Revise Hazard Communication guidance so MSDS preparers evaluate flammable liquids for static accumulation and include conductivity data, and ask the UN GHS subcommittee to add static accumulator warnings.
→ ANSI Z400.1 Committee (1)
Revise the MSDS standard to identify static accumulators, warn that bonding and grounding may be insufficient, and provide conductivity data.
→ Trade associations: ACC, API, NACD, NPCA, NPRA, SCHC (6)
Recommend that member companies update MSDSs to warn about static-accumulating flammable liquids, reference NFPA 77 and API RP 2003, and include conductivity data.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Know which of your flammable liquids are static accumulators; conductivity data matters.
Bonding and grounding are necessary but may not be sufficient for nonconductive liquids.
Control tank filling practices, such as splash filling and flow velocity, to limit static generation.
Plan for offsite consequences, including evacuations and projectiles.
PSI: Process Safety InformationSOP: Operating ProceduresTRN: TrainingEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Which of our flammable liquids are nonconductive?
►Do our SDSs give conductivity data?
►How do we fill tanks of static-accumulating liquids?
►Who would we evacuate if a tank exploded?
Immediate Action Items
✓Identify static-accumulating liquids and review handling against NFPA 77.
✓Check tank filling procedures for static controls.
✓Request conductivity data from suppliers where missing.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PSI · SOP · TRN · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Management Consulting & Document Library
📂
PSM Document Library
72 ready-to-deploy PSM documents covering all 14 OSHA elements — procedures, checklists, and audit templates built for facilities operating under 29 CFR 1910.119.
Browse the Library →
📊
Free PSM Health Score
Find out where your PSM program stands across all 14 OSHA elements. Our free health score surfaces your biggest gaps in under 10 minutes — no account required.
Check Your Score →
📞
Consulting Services
PHA facilitation, PSM program builds, compliance audits, and OSHA inspection support. Scoped per project with a written proposal before work begins — no retainer required to get started.
View Pricing →
📋 Explore the full incident library: All 111 CSB Case Studies →