Toxic Gas — Sewer Manway Release
Georgia-Pacific Naheola Mill Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning
Georgia-Pacific Corporation — Naheola Mill
📍 Pennington, AL
Incident: January 16, 2002 • CSB Report: November 20, 2002
2
Fatalities
8
Injured
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) from Sodium Hydrosulfide in a Process Sewer
Chemical / Hazard
16
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On January 16, 2002, highly toxic hydrogen sulfide gas leaked from a sewer manway at the Georgia-Pacific Naheola mill in Pennington, Alabama. Several people working near the manway were exposed. Two contractors from Burkes Construction were killed, and eight people were injured: seven Burkes Construction employees and one Davison Transport employee. Choctaw County paramedics who transported the victims also reported symptoms of H2S exposure.

The CSB's recommendations focused on preventing chemicals that can react from mixing in process sewers, including keeping sodium hydrosulfide (NaSH) out of sewers because of the potential for acidic conditions, sealing sewer manways, and protecting people in areas where H2S can be present or generated.

The CSB approved its final report on November 20, 2002, with 16 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
H2S Released from a Sewer Manway
Highly toxic H2S leaked from a sewer manway where contractors were working nearby.
Finding 02
Chemicals Could React in the Sewer
Process sewers allowed materials such as sodium hydrosulfide to enter and react under acidic conditions to generate H2S.
Finding 03
Manway Seals
The CSB recommended proper design and maintenance of manway seals on closed sewers carrying hazardous materials.
Finding 04
Contractors Not Trained on H2S
The CSB recommended that contractors working in H2S areas be trained on its hazards and emergency response.
Finding 05
Secondary Exposure of Responders
Paramedics reported H2S symptoms, showing the need to decontaminate exposed victims.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Hazardous reaction in a process sewer
Incompatible materials could mix in the sewer and generate H2S.
2
No hazard review of sewer connections
Sewer systems were not evaluated for reaction scenarios or covered by MOC.
3
People in an unrecognized H2S area
Workers near the manway lacked warning devices and H2S training.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Georgia-Pacific corporate (4)
Audit pulp and paper mills to evaluate process sewers for hazardous reactions, identify H2S areas with warning devices and training, apply hazard reviews and MOC to sewer changes, and share the findings with workers and contractors.
→ Georgia-Pacific Naheola Mill (5)
Evaluate sewer reaction scenarios, follow manufacturer guidance to keep NaSH out of sewers, maintain manway seals, institute H2S safeguards and training, and add decontamination procedures to the emergency plan.
→ Burkes Construction (1) and Davison Transport (1)
Train employees on H2S hazards and emergency response, and communicate the findings to employees who haul or handle NaSH.
→ ATSDR (1)
Amend medical management guidelines to address responder risk from H2S-exposed victims and decontamination.
→ Industry and labor organizations (4)
AF&PA, IBEW, PACE, and the Pulp and Paper Safety Association: communicate the findings to members.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Process sewers are part of the process; review them for chemical reactions.
Keep chemicals like NaSH out of sewers where acids may be present.
Identify H2S areas, install warning devices, and train everyone who works there, including contractors.
Decontaminate exposed victims so responders are not exposed too.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMOC: Management of ChangeCON: ContractorsEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►What chemicals can end up together in our sewers?
►Where could H2S be generated at our site?
►Are contractors working near sewers trained on H2S?
►Does our emergency plan include decontamination?
Immediate Action Items
✓Map sewer connections and evaluate reaction scenarios.
✓Install H2S monitors where gas could be generated.
✓Add H2S awareness to contractor orientation.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PHA · MOC · CON · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Contractors
Contractors must know the process hazards, and their safety performance must be part of how they are selected and overseen.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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