Pressure Vessel Failure — No Relief Device
D.D. Williamson & Co. Catastrophic Vessel Failure
D.D. Williamson & Co., Inc.
📍 Louisville, KY
Incident: April 11, 2003 • CSB Report: March 12, 2004
1
Fatalities
~26,000 lb
Aqueous Ammonia Released
Aqueous Ammonia (Caramel Coloring Process Vessel)
Chemical / Hazard
10
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On the morning of April 11, 2003, a process vessel at the D.D. Williamson caramel coloring plant in Louisville, Kentucky, became overpressurized and failed catastrophically. One worker was killed. The failure released about 26,000 pounds of aqueous ammonia and caused extensive damage to the plant. Up to 26 residents were evacuated and about 1,500 people sheltered in place.

The CSB found that the vessel had no pressure relief device and no basic process control or alarm instrumentation to prevent upsets. Its vent line was plugged with hardened caramel, so the vessel could not relieve internal pressure. The vessel had a damage history, and the used tanks had not been inspected, certified, or registered as pressure vessels before being brought into Kentucky.

The CSB approved its final report on March 12, 2004, with 10 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
No Pressure Relief Device
The vessel had no relief device for overpressure protection.
Finding 02
Vent Line Plugged
The vent line was plugged with hardened caramel, leaving no path to relieve pressure.
Finding 03
No Process Controls or Alarms
There was no basic process control or alarm instrumentation to prevent process upsets.
Finding 04
Used Vessel Not Registered or Inspected
The used tanks had not been inspected, certified, or registered as pressure vessels before being placed in service in Kentucky, as state law required.
Finding 05
No Review of Equipment Changes
There was no program for evaluating vessel fitness for service or the safety effect of equipment changes and new uses.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Overpressure with no relief
The vessel had no working path to relieve pressure.
2
Manual control without safeguards
Process conditions were controlled manually without alarms or interlocks.
3
Used equipment not evaluated
A used vessel with a damage history was put into service without inspection, registration, or review.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ D.D. Williamson & Co. (6)
Ensure pressure vessels are designed, fabricated, and operated to code; audit all vessels for overpressure protection and alarms or interlocks; review existing equipment when used for new purposes or when safety devices are altered; implement hazard evaluations; audit manual control of temperature and pressure; and upgrade operating procedures with operator training.
→ Commonwealth of Kentucky (1) and Mechanical Contractors Association of Kentucky (1)
Communicate that used pressure vessels are not exempt from registration and initial inspection before being placed in service in Kentucky.
→ National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (1) and RIMS (1)
Communicate the report's findings to their members.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Every pressure vessel needs a verified relief path; a plugged vent is no protection.
Used equipment must be inspected and evaluated for its new service before use.
Manual control of temperature and pressure needs alarms or interlocks.
Hazard evaluations apply to food and specialty manufacturers, not just chemical plants.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMOC: Management of ChangeSOP: Operating Procedures
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Do all our vessels have relief devices sized for their worst case?
►Could any of our vents or relief paths plug with process material?
►Have we put any used equipment into service without inspection?
►Which process conditions do we control by hand with no alarm?
Immediate Action Items
✓Inspect vents and relief paths for plugging.
✓Verify registration and inspection of all pressure vessels.
✓Add alarms or interlocks where critical conditions are manually controlled.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · PHA · MOC · SOP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
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