Reactive Hazard — Pressurized Vessel Opened
BP Amoco Polymers Thermal Decomposition Incident
BP Amoco Polymers (Amodel Plant)
📍 Augusta, GA
Incident: March 13, 2001 • CSB Report: May 20, 2002
3
Fatalities
—
Injuries (not stated in CSB summary)
Hot Molten Polymer (Amodel) and Decomposition Gases
Chemical / Hazard
11
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On March 13, 2001, three workers were killed as they opened a process vessel containing hot plastic at the BP Amoco Polymers plant in Augusta, Georgia. They did not know the vessel was pressurized.

When the partially unbolted cover blew off, hot plastic was expelled. The force of the release broke nearby tubing, and hot fluid from the tubing ignited, causing a fire. The CSB found that the hazard of a chemical reaction was not recognized: an accumulated mass of molten Amodel polymer could decompose and pressurize the vessel.

The CSB approved its final report on May 20, 2002, with 11 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Workers Unaware Vessel Was Pressurized
The workers were opening the vessel without knowing it was under pressure.
Finding 02
Decomposition Hazard Not Recognized
Process safety information did not cover decomposition reactions of Amodel or the hazard of accumulating large masses of molten polymer.
Finding 03
Equipment Opening Without Verified Depressurization
The lockout/tagout program did not ensure equipment was safe before opening, with no stop-work provision when depressurization could not be verified.
Finding 04
Operating Changes Not Covered by MOC
The CSB recommended applying MOC to operational and procedural modifications.
Finding 05
Hazard Analyses Did Not Cover Startup and Shutdown
PHAs needed to address credible deviations, startup and shutdown, and accumulation of polymer masses.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Unrecognized reactive hazard
Molten polymer accumulated and decomposed, generating pressure.
2
Unsafe equipment opening
The cover was unbolted without verifying the vessel was depressurized.
3
Gaps in PSI, PHA, and MOC
Design limits and reactive hazards were not documented or analyzed, and operational changes were not reviewed.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Solvay Advanced Polymers (8)
Implement systematic reactive hazard reviews for acquired businesses; review hazards as operating experience accrues; warn on the Amodel MSDS about accumulating molten polymer; review incident and near-miss trends; add decomposition data and equipment design limits to PSI; revalidate PHAs including startup and shutdown; require verified safe conditions and a stop-work provision before opening equipment; and apply MOC to procedural changes.
→ BP Chemicals, American Chemistry Council, and Society of Plastics Engineers (3)
Communicate the findings to their facilities and members.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Never open equipment until you have verified it is depressurized; if you cannot verify, stop and escalate.
Know whether your materials can decompose and generate gas.
PHAs must cover startup, shutdown, and abnormal accumulations.
Changes to how you operate need MOC, not just changes to hardware.
PSI: Process Safety InformationPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresMOC: Management of Change
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►How do we verify a vessel is depressurized before opening it?
►Who can stop the job if we cannot verify?
►Can any of our materials decompose if held hot too long?
►Do we run procedural changes through MOC?
Immediate Action Items
✓Add a verified-depressurization step and stop-work provision to equipment opening procedures.
✓Review PSI for decomposition hazards.
✓Confirm MOC covers procedural changes.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PSI · PHA · SOP · MOC). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
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