Refinery Fire — Hazardous Non-Routine Maintenance
Tosco Avon Refinery Naphtha Fire
Tosco Corporation — Avon Refinery
📍 Martinez, CA
Incident: February 23, 1999 • CSB Report: March 21, 2001
4
Fatalities
1
Seriously Injured
Naphtha (Released from Piping on an Operating Crude Unit Fractionator)
Chemical / Hazard
7
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On February 23, 1999, a fire in the crude unit at Tosco Corporation's Avon refinery in Martinez, California, killed four workers and seriously injured a fifth. Workers were attempting to replace leaking piping attached to a 150-foot-tall fractionator tower while the process unit was in operation.

Over the 13 days before the accident, workers had repeatedly tried to isolate and drain the pipe, but leaking and corroded shut-off valves hampered their efforts. When the pipe was being removed it still contained pressurized naphtha, which was released onto the hot fractionator and ignited. The flames engulfed five workers at different heights on the tower, on scaffolding up to about 100 feet above ground with limited means of escape.

The CSB found two root causes: Avon refinery management did not have an effective process for assessing the hazards of maintenance work and putting safeguards in place, and neither Tosco nor the facility had investigated or corrected a pattern of serious unsafe practices at the refinery. The final report, approved March 21, 2001, made 7 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Repair Attempted With the Unit Running
Workers tried to replace piping attached to an operating fractionator. The CSB said the unit should have been shut down, which would have removed ignition sources and allowed the naphtha to be fully drained.
Finding 02
Pipe Could Not Be Isolated or Drained
For 13 days, corroded and leaking valves prevented the line from being isolated and drained. The pipe still held a significant volume of pressurized naphtha when it was opened.
Finding 03
Refinery Procedures Were Not Followed
The refinery's own procedures required the piping to be isolated and drained before this kind of repair.
Finding 04
Management Oversight Was Lacking
The CSB found that management should have halted the work rather than relying on individual workers to stop an unsafe activity, and that worker error was not a root cause.
Finding 05
Earlier Warning Not Acted On
The fire came two years after a 1997 explosion at the same refinery that killed one worker and injured 46, in which management deficiencies were also a significant factor.
🔍 Root Causes
1
No effective process to assess hazardous maintenance
Management did not have an effective system for evaluating the hazards of maintenance work and implementing safeguards before work began.
2
Unsafe practices not investigated or corrected
Neither Tosco nor Avon management had investigated or corrected a pattern of serious unsafe practices at the refinery.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Tosco Corporation
Conduct periodic safety audits of its refineries covering hazardous non-routine maintenance, management oversight, MOC, and corrosion control, with written findings shared with the workforce and tracked to completion (1999-014-I-CA-1).
→ Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (Golden Eagle refinery, new owner)
Implement a program for safe hazardous non-routine maintenance: written multidisciplinary hazard evaluation, higher management review for higher-hazard jobs, a written protocol for when to shut down a unit, management presence at the job site, and permits that specify actions if isolation or draining cannot be achieved (1999-014-I-CA-2).
→ Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
Conduct MOC reviews for changes in operating conditions such as feedstock, throughput, or prolonged use of manual bypasses (1999-014-I-CA-3).
→ Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
Ensure the corrosion management program controls corrosion before loss of containment or plugging (1999-014-I-CA-4).
→ API, NPRA, PACE
Communicate the report's findings to members (1999-014-I-CA-5).

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
When a line cannot be isolated and drained, that is a signal to stop and reassess, not to work around it.
Hazardous non-routine maintenance needs a written hazard review and a clear decision rule for shutting down the unit.
Stopping unsafe work is management's job, not just the worker's.
Patterns of unsafe practice are warnings; investigating and correcting them prevents the next incident.
SOP: Operating ProceduresMOC: Management of ChangeMI: Mechanical IntegrityAUD: Compliance Audits
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►What is our written rule for when a unit must be shut down to make a repair safely?
►Who has to approve a job when isolation or draining cannot be confirmed?
►How often do supervisors and managers visit high-hazard jobs in progress?
►Do we track and correct repeated unsafe practices, or just individual incidents?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review the procedure for hazardous non-routine maintenance and add a shutdown decision protocol if missing.
✓Require management sign-off on any job where isolation or draining cannot be verified.
✓Check corrosion-related valve failures as a possible MI gap.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (SOP · MOC · MI · AUD). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
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Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
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Compliance Audits
Compliance audits exist to find gaps before an incident does. Findings only help when they are tracked and corrected.
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