Hazardous Waste Fire — Community Evacuation
EQ Hazardous Waste Plant Explosions and Fire
Environmental Quality Company (EQ North Carolina)
📍 Apex, NC
Incident: October 5, 2006 • CSB Report: April 16, 2008
0
Fatalities
~30
Medically Evaluated
Mixed Hazardous Wastes — Oxidizers, Aircraft Oxygen Generators, Flammables, Pesticides
Chemical / Hazard
6
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On the night of October 5, 2006, explosions and fire destroyed the Environmental Quality Company (EQ) hazardous waste transfer facility in Apex, North Carolina, a suburb of Raleigh. Approximately 16,000 residents were evacuated, and the evacuation order stayed in place for two days until the fire subsided. About 30 people, including one firefighter and 12 police officers, needed medical evaluation for respiratory distress and other symptoms.

The CSB found that a small fire started in the facility's oxidizer storage bay. The bay held chemical oxygen generators removed from aircraft that had not been activated and discharged before entering the waste stream, with solid chlorine-based pool chemicals stacked on top. The fire spread quickly, most likely as the oxygen generators discharged and accelerated it.

The facility was unstaffed and unmonitored after hours. It had only portable fire extinguishers, no fire walls, and no automatic suppression, and its storage bays were separated only by six-inch curbs. Responders lacked specific information on the stored chemicals. The final report, released April 16, 2008, made 6 recommendations, including urgent recommendations issued in June 2007.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Fire Began in the Oxidizer Bay
A small fire started in the oxidizer storage bay, one of six bays where wastes were consolidated before transfer off-site.
Finding 02
Unspent Aircraft Oxygen Generators
Chemical oxygen generators removed from aircraft had not been activated and discharged before shipment, and likely accelerated the fire. Pool chemicals were stacked on top of the box containing them.
Finding 03
No Fire Separation or Automatic Suppression
Only portable extinguishers were on site. With no fire walls and only six-inch curbs between bays, the fire spread into bays with flammables, corrosives, lab wastes, paints, and pesticides.
Finding 04
Responders Lacked Chemical Information
Emergency responders did not have specific information on the chemicals stored at the site, and EQ had limited prior contact with the Apex Fire Department.
Finding 05
Regulatory Gaps
RCRA requires fire control equipment but does not specify it, there was no national fire code for hazardous waste facilities, and rules did not define what chemical information facilities must share with responders. The CSB identified 22 other hazardous waste facility fires, explosions, or releases in the previous five years.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Incompatible and reactive wastes stored together
Unspent oxygen generators and oxidizing pool chemicals in the same bay created the conditions for a fast-growing fire.
2
Inadequate fire protection
No fire walls, detection, or automatic suppression allowed a small fire to destroy the facility.
3
Hazard information not shared
Responders could not assess the hazard and ordered a large precautionary evacuation.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ EPA
Require permitted hazardous waste facilities to give state and local responders written information on the type, quantity, and location of materials, updated periodically (2007-1-I-NC-1). Status: Closed — Acceptable Action.
→ Environmental Technology Council
Petition NFPA to develop a fire protection standard for hazardous waste facilities, and develop standardized guidance on waste handling and storage (2007-1-I-NC-2, -3). Superseded by later Veolia recommendations.
→ Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. (Urgent)
Ensure expired chemical oxygen generators are actuated before shipping, correct hazardous waste shipping characterization, and notify recipients of the hazard and any shipping errors (urgent recommendations, June 2007). Status: Closed — Acceptable Action.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Know exactly what is in each storage area, and keep incompatible materials apart.
Reactive items such as oxygen generators must be made safe before they enter a waste stream.
Unstaffed facilities need fire detection and suppression, not just extinguishers.
Share chemical inventory information with local responders before an emergency.
EAP: Emergency PlanningPSI: Process Safety InformationMI: Mechanical Integrity
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Could an incompatible material end up stored next to oxidizers at our site?
►How would a fire be detected and suppressed when no one is on site?
►Does our local fire department know what we store and where?
►How do we confirm reactive items are rendered safe before disposal?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review storage segregation for oxidizers and reactive materials.
✓Confirm after-hours fire detection and alarm coverage.
✓Send current chemical inventory and site maps to the local fire department.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 3 PSM-related areas (EAP · PSI · MI). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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