Reactive Chemical — Runaway Reaction
Synthron Runaway Reaction and Explosion
Synthron, LLC (owned by Protex International)
📍 Morganton, NC
Incident: January 31, 2006 • CSB Report: July 31, 2007
1
Fatalities
14
Injured
Acrylic Monomers (Butyl Acrylate) in Toluene and Cyclohexane Solvents
Chemical / Hazard
1
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On January 31, 2006, a runaway chemical reaction in a 1,500-gallon batch reactor at the Synthron chemical plant in Morganton, North Carolina, led to an explosion that fatally burned a maintenance supervisor and injured 14 others, two seriously. The blast destroyed the facility and broke windows up to one-third of a mile away. Two churches and a home were damaged and later condemned.

Synthron made acrylic polymers for paint and coating additives by reacting acrylic monomers in flammable solvents. Heat from the reaction was removed by condensing solvent vapor in a water-cooled overhead condenser. To fill an order larger than the normal batch, managers made one larger batch and added all the extra monomer in the first stage. CSB testing showed this raised the maximum heat output by a factor of at least 2.3, beyond the condenser's cooling capacity, and the reaction ran away.

Solvent vapor leaked from the reactor hatch, operators left the building, and a flammable vapor cloud formed inside and exploded. The CSB found inadequate management of reactive hazards, no emergency preparedness for a process emergency, and ineffective oversight by parent company Protex International. The final report was issued July 31, 2007, with 1 recommendation.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Batch Size Change Exceeded Cooling Capacity
Making one larger batch and adding all extra monomer in the first stage raised the peak heat output by at least 2.3 times, more than the condenser could remove.
Finding 02
Cooling Capacity Never Documented; Condenser Fouled
Synthron had apparently never documented the condenser's actual cooling capacity. The cooling water side had not been cleaned or inspected in about 30 years and was fouled, likely reducing capacity by at least 25 percent.
Finding 03
Reactor Hatch Improperly Secured
The hatch was secured with only 4 of the 18 recommended clamps. Vapor escaped at about 23 psig, well below the reactor's 75 psig maximum working pressure.
Finding 04
Minimal Process Safety Information and No PHA
Synthron had gathered minimal safety information on its polymer processes, had not performed a process hazard analysis of the reactor, and had no safeguards to detect, prevent, or mitigate a runaway.
Finding 05
Inexperienced Staff and No Emergency Preparedness
Most management and operations staff had been on the job less than a year. Procedures did not cover a loss of reactor control, there were no evacuation drills or emergency alarm, and the CSB concluded there was enough time to evacuate everyone safely.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Reactive hazards not identified or controlled
The heat release of the larger batch was not evaluated against cooling capacity, and no safeguards existed for a runaway.
2
Process change made without hazard review
Changing the batch size and monomer addition was a change to the process that was not evaluated.
3
Equipment not maintained or used as designed
A fouled condenser and an under-clamped hatch reduced the margin of safety.
4
Ineffective corporate oversight
Protex International had reactive hazard testing capability in Europe but did not apply it to Synthron's processes or provide adequate technical support.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Protex International
Establish a program to manage reactive hazards at its U.S. facilities in line with good industry practice: identify and characterize reactive hazards; implement and maintain safeguards; manage recipe changes; document safety-critical equipment capabilities; train personnel on reactive hazards, safe limits, and responses to deviations; train on emergency evacuation and conduct drills; and audit the program (2006-4-I-NC-1). Status: Closed — Acceptable Action.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Changing batch size or addition sequence in a reactive process is a process change that needs a hazard evaluation.
Know the actual capacity of the equipment that keeps a reaction under control, and keep it maintained.
Runaway reactions need multiple independent safeguards, such as high pressure alarms, emergency cooling, or a way to dump the reactor.
An emergency alarm and evacuation drills can turn an explosion into a near miss.
PSI: Process Safety InformationPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMOC: Management of ChangeMI: Mechanical IntegrityEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►Do we know the heat release of each reaction and the capacity of the cooling that controls it?
►Would a change in batch size or charge sequence go through MOC at our site?
►When were our reactor condensers and cooling surfaces last cleaned and inspected?
►If a reactor started venting, how would everyone know to evacuate, and to where?
Immediate Action Items
✓Confirm reactive hazard data exists for each reactive process and is in the PSI.
✓Add batch size and recipe changes to the MOC trigger list.
✓Verify reactor closures are secured per manufacturer instructions.
✓Check that the site has an emergency alarm and that evacuation has been drilled.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 5 PSM-related areas (PSI · PHA · MOC · MI · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Management Consulting & Document Library
📂
PSM Document Library
72 ready-to-deploy PSM documents covering all 14 OSHA elements — procedures, checklists, and audit templates built for facilities operating under 29 CFR 1910.119.
Browse the Library →
📊
Free PSM Health Score
Find out where your PSM program stands across all 14 OSHA elements. Our free health score surfaces your biggest gaps in under 10 minutes — no account required.
Check Your Score →
📞
Consulting Services
PHA facilitation, PSM program builds, compliance audits, and OSHA inspection support. Scoped per project with a written proposal before work begins — no retainer required to get started.
View Pricing →
📋 Explore the full incident library: All 111 CSB Case Studies →