Combustible Dust Flash Fire
US Ink Dust Collection System Flash Fire
US Ink (subsidiary of Sun Chemical Corporation)
📍 East Rutherford, NJ
Incident: October 9, 2012 • CSB Report: January 15, 2015
0
Fatalities
7
Workers Burned
Combustible Dust (Carbon Black and Gilsonite) with Condensable Hydrocarbon Vapors
Chemical / Hazard
8
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On October 9, 2012, a flash fire burned seven workers, one seriously, at the US Ink plant in East Rutherford, New Jersey. US Ink, a subsidiary of Sun Chemical, makes printing inks by mixing fine particulate solids such as pigments and binders with liquid oils in agitated tanks.

The CSB found that the fire resulted from combustible dust accumulating inside a poorly designed dust collection system that had been put into operation only four days earlier. Carbon black and Gilsonite dust combined with condensable hydrocarbon vapors in the ductwork. Within about a day the accumulated material overheated and ignited, causing a flash fire at the bag dump station and an explosion in the rooftop dust collector. The explosion was contained by suppression equipment, but the pressure reversed the airflow back into the pre-mix room, where a second flash fire engulfed seven workers.

Neither US Ink nor Sun Chemical performed a hazard analysis, management of change review, or testing of the new system before it started up. The company treated it as a replacement in kind, even though the new system was an entirely different design. The CSB issued its report on January 15, 2015, with 8 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
New Dust Collection System Was Poorly Designed
Airflow and air velocity were well below industry recommendations, and the ductwork did not follow ACGIH Industrial Ventilation Manual guidance or NFPA 91, so dust and sludge accumulated in the ducts.
Finding 02
Housekeeping Hoses Added Contaminants
Three vacuum hoses for floor cleaning were connected to the closed ductwork, adding dirt and debris that helped plug the system within days.
Finding 03
No Hazard Analysis, MOC, or Testing Before Startup
The company skipped the PHA and MOC its own policy required, treating the new system as a replacement in kind. The system was not tested or thoroughly commissioned before operation began.
Finding 04
Design Changes and Loss of Project Knowledge
The original design was changed, the responsible company engineer retired before the project was complete, and engineering oversight of the installation contractors was lacking.
Finding 05
Emergency Response Plan Not Effective
Workers had emergency training but did not follow it, because an effective hazard communication and response plan had not been implemented. The system was not shut down after the first flash fire, and the designated fire coordinator was among the injured.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Inadequate design of the dust collection system
Insufficient air velocity and contaminated inputs allowed combustible dust and condensable hydrocarbons to accumulate, overheat, and ignite.
2
Change not managed as a change
Treating a different-design system as a replacement in kind bypassed the PHA and MOC that would have examined the hazards.
3
No commissioning or pre-startup testing
Running the system without confirming it worked as designed meant the flaws surfaced only as a fire.
4
Ineffective emergency response
Without an implemented response plan, workers gathered at the pre-mix room doorway and were engulfed by the second flash fire.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ US Ink / Sun Chemical
Require PHA, MOC, engineering drawing review, contractor safety management, and NFPA 91/654-based operator training for new installations and equipment modifications (2013-01-I-NJ-7).
→ US Ink / Sun Chemical
Install automatic fire alarm systems consistent with NFPA 72 in manufacturing areas where heat generation could occur (2013-01-I-NJ-6).
→ US Ink / Sun Chemical
Develop a management of organizational change protocol to transfer knowledge to new personnel (2013-01-I-NJ-8).
→ OSHA
Add printing ink manufacturing (NAICS 325910) to the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (2013-01-I-NJ-1). Status: Closed — Acceptable Action.
→ New Jersey Department of Community Affairs
Remove the construction code exemption for process equipment handling combustible dust, and train local code officials on NFPA dust standards (2013-01-I-NJ-3, -4).

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
A new system of a different design is a change, not a replacement in kind. It needs a hazard review before startup.
Dust collection systems must be designed and tested for the actual materials, including any condensable vapors.
Commissioning should confirm a system works as designed before production depends on it.
An emergency plan has to be practiced and include who shuts what down.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMOC: Management of ChangePSSR: Pre-Startup Safety ReviewEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
►How do we decide whether an equipment replacement is truly in kind?
►Were our dust collection systems designed to NFPA 91/654 and verified for air velocity after installation?
►What triggers a pre-startup review for new equipment at our site?
►Who shuts down process equipment during a fire, and does everyone know?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review recent equipment replacements to confirm each in-kind decision is documented and correct.
✓Verify dust collection air velocities against design and NFPA guidance.
✓Drill the emergency response plan, including equipment shutdown responsibilities.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PHA · MOC · PSSR · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
New or modified equipment must be confirmed safe, built as designed, and covered by procedures and training before hazardous materials are introduced.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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