At about 1:20 p.m. on March 23, 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the restart of the hydrocarbon isomerization (ISOM) unit. Fifteen workers were killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack.
The explosions occurred when a distillation tower, the raffinate splitter, was overfilled with hydrocarbons and overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release of flammable liquid from the blowdown drum and vent stack. The vapor cloud ignited.
The CSB concluded that organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of BP caused the disaster. It issued urgent recommendations in 2005, including that BP's board commission an independent panel (the Baker Panel), and approved its final report on March 20, 2007. In total, 26 recommendations were issued, including two from a related safety bulletin on positive material verification.
Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.
This incident involved breakdowns across 5 PSM-related areas (SOP · PSSR · MOC · PHA · TRN). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.