On June 11, 2008, a heat exchanger containing pressurized anhydrous ammonia ruptured violently at the Goodyear synthetic rubber plant in Houston, Texas. Debris struck and killed an employee walking through the area, and about seven others were injured, including workers exposed to the released ammonia.
The day before, maintenance workers closed a valve that isolated the exchanger from its relief valve so they could replace a burst rupture disk below it. The next morning, an operator closed another valve blocking an automatic pressure control valve to steam-clean a process line. Unaware that the relief isolation valve was still closed, there was no way to relieve pressure, and the exchanger exploded. The maintenance work had not been communicated to the next shift.
The plant was evacuated, but the electronic badge tracking system malfunctioned. The fatally injured employee, a member of the emergency response team, was not found until about 1:20 p.m. Evacuation drills required four times a year had not been held for several years. The CSB released its case study on January 27, 2011.
Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.
This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · SOP · EAP · TRN). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.