Heat Exchanger Overpressure — Ammonia Release
Goodyear Heat Exchanger Rupture
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company — Houston Synthetic Rubber Plant
📍 Houston, TX
Incident: June 11, 2008 • CSB Report: January 27, 2011 (case study)
1
Fatalities
~7
Injured
Anhydrous Ammonia (Heat Exchanger Coolant)
Chemical / Hazard
0
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On June 11, 2008, a heat exchanger containing pressurized anhydrous ammonia ruptured violently at the Goodyear synthetic rubber plant in Houston, Texas. Debris struck and killed an employee walking through the area, and about seven others were injured, including workers exposed to the released ammonia.

The day before, maintenance workers closed a valve that isolated the exchanger from its relief valve so they could replace a burst rupture disk below it. The next morning, an operator closed another valve blocking an automatic pressure control valve to steam-clean a process line. Unaware that the relief isolation valve was still closed, there was no way to relieve pressure, and the exchanger exploded. The maintenance work had not been communicated to the next shift.

The plant was evacuated, but the electronic badge tracking system malfunctioned. The fatally injured employee, a member of the emergency response team, was not found until about 1:20 p.m. Evacuation drills required four times a year had not been held for several years. The CSB released its case study on January 27, 2011.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Relief Valve Isolated During Maintenance
Workers closed a valve isolating the exchanger from its relief valve to replace a burst rupture disk, and it was not reopened.
Finding 02
Shift Handover Failure
The isolation of the relief line was not communicated between maintenance and operations, or to the next shift.
Finding 03
ASME Code Not Followed
The ASME code requires overpressure protection to be continually provided whenever a vessel can be overpressured. The CSB said the accident likely would not have happened if the code had been followed.
Finding 04
Headcount Failed
The badge tracking system malfunctioned, and the victim's absence from the muster point was not recognized because she was on the emergency response team.
Finding 05
Drills Not Held
Company procedures called for quarterly evacuation and shelter-in-place drills, but none had been held for several years.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Overpressure protection defeated
The relief path was blocked and no one monitored the isolated relief system.
2
Poor communication of maintenance status
The next shift did not know the relief valve was isolated.
3
Emergency response weaknesses
Accounting for personnel failed and drills had lapsed.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ No formal recommendations
The CSB issued a case study on January 27, 2011, with lessons learned, including adhering to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirement for continuous overpressure protection and conducting emergency drills and headcount training.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Never leave a vessel without overpressure protection; monitor any isolated relief path and reopen it as soon as work is done.
Communicate isolations clearly across maintenance, operations, and shifts.
Practice evacuation and headcounts so every person is accounted for.
Emergency responders must be accounted for too.
MI: Mechanical IntegritySOP: Operating ProceduresEAP: Emergency PlanningTRN: Training
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Relief Valve Isolation, Post-Maintenance Verification & MOC
►How do we track valves that isolate relief devices?
►How is maintenance status handed off between shifts?
►When did we last run an evacuation drill with a headcount?
►How would we know someone was missing?
Immediate Action Items
✓Implement a car-seal or relief isolation log with shift handover review.
✓Schedule evacuation drills with timed headcounts.
✓Test the personnel accountability system.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · SOP · EAP · TRN). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements.
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