Explosives Plant — Two Explosions
Sierra Chemical Co. High Explosives Accident
Sierra Chemical Company — Kean Canyon Plant
📍 Mustang, NV
Incident: January 7, 1998 • CSB Report: September 23, 1998
4
Fatalities
6
Injured
High Explosives (Explosives Manufacturing)
Chemical / Hazard
16
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On January 7, 1998, two explosions in rapid succession destroyed the Sierra Chemical Company Kean Canyon plant near Mustang, Nevada. Four workers were killed and six others were injured.

The CSB's recommendations show the areas it found lacking: PHAs that examine quantity-distance, building design, human factors, and lessons from other explosives manufacturers; process-specific written procedures; communicating hazards in languages workers understand; explosives training with demonstrated proficiency; MOC and pre-startup reviews; and control of detonation sources such as foreign objects in reclaimed raw materials, friction, impact, and static. It also called for adequate separation between operations to keep one explosion from propagating to another.

The CSB approved its final report on September 23, 1998, with 16 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Two Explosions Destroyed the Plant
Explosions in rapid succession destroyed the facility, killing four and injuring six.
Finding 02
Propagation Between Operations
The CSB recommended adequate separation between operations and design to reduce secondary fragmentation that could propagate explosions.
Finding 03
Detonation Sources Not Controlled
The CSB called for safety programs covering foreign objects in raw materials, substitute materials, impact, friction, sparking, and static.
Finding 04
Language and Training Barriers
Procedures and hazard information needed to be in languages workers understood, with training that demonstrates proficiency.
Finding 05
Reclaimed Explosives
The CSB recommended that reclaimed, demilitarized explosives be screened for foreign materials.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Inadequate hazard analysis
PHAs did not fully address explosives hazards and siting.
2
Weak procedures and training
Workers lacked process-specific procedures and training in a language they understood.
3
Insufficient separation
Plant layout allowed one explosion to propagate.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Sierra and explosives manufacturers (10)
Evaluate explosives safety programs: PHAs covering quantity-distance, building design, and human factors; specific written procedures; communication in workers' languages; training with demonstrated proficiency; MOC and PSSR; periodic PSM audits; effective employee participation; control of detonation sources; and adequate separation between operations.
→ Department of Defense (2)
Ensure reclaimed, demilitarized explosives are free of foreign materials, and share explosives incident lessons learned.
→ Institute of Makers of Explosives (3)
Develop training and proficiency guidelines, distribute the CSB report, and develop guidelines for screening reclaimed explosives.
→ Nevada OSHA (1)
Increase the frequency of inspections at explosives manufacturing facilities.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Separate hazardous operations so one event cannot cascade.
Communicate procedures and hazards in the languages your workers use.
Control foreign material, friction, impact, and static around energetic materials.
Train to demonstrated proficiency, not just attendance.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresTRN: TrainingMOC: Management of Change
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Explosive Material Handling & Critical Procedural Compliance
►Could an explosion in one building propagate to another?
►Are our procedures available in every language our workers speak?
►How do we screen raw materials for foreign objects?
►How do we confirm workers can perform critical tasks safely?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review building separation and quantity-distance.
✓Audit procedure language accessibility.
✓Add raw material screening steps.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PHA · SOP · TRN · MOC). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements.
Supporting documents in our library →
Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Management Consulting & Document Library
📂
PSM Document Library
72 ready-to-deploy PSM documents covering all 14 OSHA elements — procedures, checklists, and audit templates built for facilities operating under 29 CFR 1910.119.
Browse the Library →
📊
Free PSM Health Score
Find out where your PSM program stands across all 14 OSHA elements. Our free health score surfaces your biggest gaps in under 10 minutes — no account required.
Check Your Score →
📞
Consulting Services
PHA facilitation, PSM program builds, compliance audits, and OSHA inspection support. Scoped per project with a written proposal before work begins — no retainer required to get started.
View Pricing →
📋 Explore the full incident library: All 111 CSB Case Studies →