Storage Tank Collapse — Fertilizer Release
Allied Terminals Fertilizer Tank Collapse
Allied Terminals, Inc.
📍 Chesapeake, VA
Incident: November 12, 2008 • CSB Report: May 2009
0
Fatalities
2
Contract Workers Critically Injured
Liquid Fertilizer (Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solution)
Chemical / Hazard
10
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On November 12, 2008, a two-million-gallon liquid fertilizer storage tank collapsed at the Allied Terminals facility in Chesapeake, Virginia. Two contract workers were critically injured. Two members of the public who tried to help them required treatment likely related to ammonia vapor from the fertilizer.

The fertilizer overtopped the containment dike and flooded parts of a nearby neighborhood. At least 200,000 gallons could not be accounted for, and some reached the Elizabeth River, which flows into the Chesapeake Bay.

The CSB issued urgent recommendations in December 2008 citing welding defects on several remaining tanks, and released its final report in May 2009 with 10 recommendations, including state regulation of large fertilizer tanks.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Catastrophic Tank Failure
A two-million-gallon fertilizer tank collapsed.
Finding 02
Welding Defects
The CSB cited a hazard to the public from welding defects on several remaining tanks and urged reducing their fill heights.
Finding 03
Fill Height Not Verified
The CSB recommended verifying that maximum liquid levels met API 653, including radiography of welds used in the calculation.
Finding 04
Workers in Containment During First Fill
The CSB recommended excluding all personnel from secondary containment during initial filling after major modification.
Finding 05
Containment Overtopped
Fertilizer overtopped the dike, flooded a neighborhood, and reached the Elizabeth River.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Defective welds
Weld quality did not support the fill height used.
2
Inadequate inspection verification
Radiography required for the maximum fill calculation was not verified.
3
No regulation of large fertilizer tanks
Virginia did not regulate design, construction, and inspection of these tanks.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Allied Terminals (5)
Reduce fill heights and evaluate the remaining tanks for fitness for service (urgent), verify maximum liquid levels against API 653, and exclude personnel from containment during initial filling after major changes.
→ Governor and Legislature of Virginia (1)
Regulate fertilizer tanks of 100,000 gallons or more, or authorize local regulation.
→ U.S. EPA (1)
Revise the rupture hazard safety alert to include this failure and the increased risk during first fill or hydrotest.
→ HMT Inspection (2) and The Fertilizer Institute (1)
Use TFI tank inspection guidelines, verify required radiography, and recommend the guidelines to members.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Tank fill heights must be based on verified weld quality.
First fill after modification is a high-risk period; keep people out of the containment.
Inspection reports must confirm the data behind the calculations.
Containment must be able to hold a catastrophic release.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPSSR: Pre-Startup Safety ReviewSOP: Operating ProceduresCON: Contractors
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Storage Tank Mechanical Integrity & Repair Standards
►How were our tank fill heights determined?
►Was required weld radiography actually performed?
►Who is allowed in a dike during a first fill?
►Could our containment hold a full tank failure?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review tank fill height calculations against API 653.
✓Add a first-fill exclusion zone to procedures.
✓Evaluate containment capacity for catastrophic failure.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · PSSR · SOP · CON). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
New or modified equipment must be confirmed safe, built as designed, and covered by procedures and training before hazardous materials are introduced.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Contractors
Contractors must know the process hazards, and their safety performance must be part of how they are selected and overseen.
Supporting documents in our library →
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