Freeze-Cracked Dead Leg — Propane Fire
Valero McKee Refinery Propane Fire
Valero Energy Corporation — McKee Refinery
📍 Sunray, TX
Incident: February 16, 2007 • CSB Report: July 9, 2008
0
Fatalities
3
Seriously Burned
Propane (Propane Deasphalting Unit)
Chemical / Hazard
12
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On February 16, 2007, a propane fire erupted at the Valero McKee Refinery in Sunray, Texas, north of Amarillo. Three workers were seriously burned, and the refinery was forced to shut down.

The CSB determined that water froze and cracked an idle section of process piping in the propane deasphalting unit. The resulting leak ignited, and the fire spread quickly, in part because a major pipe rack carrying flammable hydrocarbons rapidly collapsed; some of its support columns had not been fireproofed.

The CSB's final report, issued July 9, 2008, made 12 recommendations, covering freeze protection, fireproofing for jet fire scenarios, remotely operated shutoff valves, and PHA quality.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Water Froze in an Idle Pipe
Water collected in an infrequently used section of piping, froze, and cracked it, releasing propane.
Finding 02
Pipe Rack Collapsed
The fire spread as a major pipe rack collapsed; some support columns were not fireproofed.
Finding 03
No Remote Isolation
The CSB recommended remotely operable shutoff valves (ROSOVs) to isolate large flammable releases.
Finding 04
Freeze Protection Program Lacking
The CSB recommended written freeze protection programs that identify dead legs and treat infrequently used piping as an MOC trigger.
Finding 05
PHA Program Weaknesses
The CSB recommended improving PHA practices, including workforce involvement, training, quality checks, and follow-up on recommendations.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Unmanaged dead leg
Idle piping where water could collect was not identified or protected from freezing.
2
Inadequate fireproofing
Pipe rack supports near high-pressure flammables were not protected against jet fire.
3
No rapid isolation
Equipment containing pressurized flammables could not be quickly isolated remotely.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ American Petroleum Institute (4)
Issue freeze protection practices; revise API 2218 to address jet fire and more protective fireproofing; revise API RP 2001 and 2030 to include ROSOVs; and revise API 2510 and 2510A on deluge activation.
→ Valero Energy Corporation (5)
Install ROSOVs where its emergency isolation valve standard applies, require written freeze protection programs, require jet fire evaluation in fireproofing specs, audit PHA performance, and replace chlorine used for cooling water treatment with inherently safer materials.
→ Valero McKee Refinery, USW, and USW Local 13-487 (3)
Work together to benchmark and improve the McKee PHA program, including workforce involvement, training, quality control, and timely close-out.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Find and manage dead legs before winter.
Treat infrequently used piping as a hazard that needs MOC review.
Fireproof pipe rack supports near high-pressure flammables, considering jet fires.
Remotely operated shutoff valves let you isolate a release without walking into the fire.
MOC: Management of ChangePHA: Process Hazard AnalysisMI: Mechanical IntegrityEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Dead-Leg Freeze Management & Cold-Climate Mechanical Integrity
►Where could water collect and freeze in our idle piping?
►Are our pipe rack supports fireproofed near pressurized flammables?
►Can we isolate large inventories remotely?
►How do we follow up on PHA recommendations?
Immediate Action Items
✓Survey for dead legs and add them to winterization plans.
✓Review fireproofing against jet fire scenarios.
✓Identify where ROSOVs are needed.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MOC · PHA · MI · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Management of Change (MOC)
Changes to equipment, chemistry, operating limits, or procedures that bypass formal review create new hazard pathways your PHA never evaluated.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
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