Line Opening — Flammable Condensate Fire
Bethlehem Steel Gas Condensate Fire
Bethlehem Steel Corporation — Burns Harbor Mill
📍 Chesterton, IN
Incident: February 2, 2001 • CSB Report: December 6, 2001
2
Fatalities
4
Injured
Coke Oven Gas (COG) Condensate
Chemical / Hazard
13
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On February 2, 2001, a fire at Bethlehem Steel Corporation's Burns Harbor mill in Chesterton, Indiana, killed a Bethlehem Steel millwright and a contractor supervisor. Four millwrights were injured, one seriously.

Workers were removing a slip blind and a cracked valve from a coke oven gas line leading to a decommissioned furnace. During removal of the valve, flammable liquid condensate was released and ignited. The CSB found inadequate supervision of hazardous maintenance work.

The CSB approved its final report on December 6, 2001, with 13 recommendations.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Flammable Liquid in a Gas Line
Coke oven gas condensate in the line was flammable, and the hazard was not recognized.
Finding 02
Line Opened Without a Low-Point Drain
The CSB recommended low-point drains and higher-level approval for opening lines that may contain flammable liquids.
Finding 03
Dead Legs
The CSB recommended surveying for dead legs, where condensate can accumulate, and including them in winterization.
Finding 04
Inadequate Supervision
The CSB found inadequate supervision of hazardous maintenance work.
Finding 05
Hazard Communication
The MSDS for COG condensate did not highlight its flammability.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Unrecognized flammable inventory
Workers did not expect flammable liquid in the line.
2
Weak work authorization
High-risk line opening lacked higher-level review and oversight.
3
Decommissioning hazards
Lines to a decommissioned furnace still held hazardous material.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Burns Harbor Mill (6)
Require higher-level authorization for high-risk line opening, monitor condensate accumulation and flammability, survey and resolve dead legs, add low-point drains, train employees and contractors on flammable liquid hazards, and replace insulation removed for maintenance. (Two were closed as unacceptable.)
→ Bethlehem Steel Corporation (3)
Audit work authorization, line opening, dead leg, and decommissioning programs; revise the COG condensate MSDS; and communicate the findings.
→ Industry and labor organizations (4)
AISI, Association of Iron and Steel Engineers, AFL-CIO Building Trades, and USWA: communicate the findings to members.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Assume lines may contain flammable liquid until drained and verified.
High-risk line breaks need higher-level authorization and oversight.
Decommissioned equipment can still hold hazardous material.
Dead legs collect liquids; find and eliminate them.
SOP: Operating ProceduresHW: Hot WorkCON: ContractorsMI: Mechanical Integrity
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Hazardous Maintenance Work Planning & Line Clearing
►How do we confirm a line is empty before opening it?
►Who approves high-risk line breaks?
►What is still connected to our decommissioned equipment?
►Where are our dead legs?
Immediate Action Items
✓Add drain-and-verify steps to line opening permits.
✓Require supervisor approval for line breaks without low-point drains.
✓Survey decommissioned systems for remaining inventory.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (SOP · HW · CON · MI). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Hot Work Permits
Hot work near flammable materials requires a permit, gas testing, and control of nearby hazards before any cutting or welding begins.
Supporting documents in our library →
Contractors
Contractors must know the process hazards, and their safety performance must be part of how they are selected and overseen.
Supporting documents in our library →
Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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