Toxic H2S Release During Decommissioning — Investigation Ongoing
Catalyst Refiners Hydrogen Sulfide Release
Catalyst Refiners, Inc. (Ames Goldsmith Corporation)
📍 Institute, WV
Incident: April 22, 2026 • CSB Report: Investigation ongoing (update released August 13, 2026)
2
Fatalities
4
Seriously Injured
Hydrogen Sulfide from Mixing Nitric Acid with M-2000A (Sodium Trithiocarbonate)
Chemical / Hazard
Pending
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On April 22, 2026, a chemical reaction released highly toxic hydrogen sulfide at the Catalyst Refiners facility in Institute, West Virginia, which was being decommissioned. Two employees were killed and four others were seriously injured. A shelter-in-place order was issued within one mile; 22 people, including four responders, were decontaminated and 18 were taken for medical evaluation.

Employees disposing of leftover chemicals pumped about 80 gallons of A-50 (a calcium chloride coagulant) and 275 gallons of M-2000A (a sodium trithiocarbonate metal precipitant) into a wastewater receiving tank, then began pumping in diluted nitric acid. A reaction and fog formed. The pump operator and a supervisor lost consciousness and recovered; two other employees who entered the area to help were overcome and died.

There was no written procedure for disposing of these chemicals. Respirators on site did not all have filters for gases like H2S, workers said respirator use was no longer required during decommissioning, and personal gas monitors were not provided. The CSB investigation is ongoing and no recommendations have been issued.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Incompatible Chemicals Mixed
Nitric acid was pumped into a tank already holding M-2000A and A-50, producing toxic vapors.
Finding 02
No Written Disposal Procedure
There was no written procedure for disposing of these chemicals through the wastewater system.
Finding 03
Respiratory Protection Lacking
Respirators were not all equipped for hazardous gases, and use was no longer required during decommissioning.
Finding 04
No Personal Gas Monitors
Workers were not provided or required to use personal gas monitors.
Finding 05
Rescue Fatalities
The two employees who died had entered the area to help coworkers.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Under investigation
The CSB has not issued final causes.
2
Areas being examined
Chemical incompatibilities, decommissioning hazard analysis, disposal procedures, PPE and atmospheric monitoring, and corporate oversight.
3
Final report pending
Findings and any recommendations will be in the CSB's final report.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Investigation ongoing
The CSB has not issued recommendations. Findings and any recommendations will be published in its final report.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
Decommissioning is non-routine work and needs its own hazard analysis.
Check chemical compatibility before combining anything in a tank.
Write procedures for chemical disposal, not just production.
Untrained, unprotected rescue attempts can add victims; provide gas monitors and plan rescues.
PHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresPSI: Process Safety InformationEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Decommissioning Chemical Hazards & H2S Safety
►What chemicals would be left over if we shut down a unit?
►How do we check compatibility before mixing wastes?
►Do workers carry H2S monitors where H2S could form?
►What is our rescue plan for a toxic gas release?
Immediate Action Items
✓Add a chemical compatibility check to waste disposal procedures.
✓Perform a hazard analysis before decommissioning work.
✓Provide personal gas monitors where toxic gases could be generated.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (PHA · SOP · PSI · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Accurate, complete Process Safety Information is the foundation every other PSM element depends on. When PSI is missing or wrong — chemistry data, equipment specs, P&IDs — the entire hazard analysis is built on a flawed base.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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