Chlorine Scrubber Over-Chlorination Release
DPC Enterprises Glendale Chlorine Release
DPC Enterprises, L.P. — Glendale Chlorine Repackaging Facility
📍 Glendale, AZ
Incident: November 17, 2003 • CSB Report: February 28, 2007
0
Fatalities
14
Treated (incl. 10 Police Officers)
Chlorine
Chemical / Hazard
14
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

On November 17, 2003, chlorine gas was released from the DPC Enterprises chlorine repackaging facility in Glendale, Arizona, near Phoenix. Fourteen people, including ten police officers, required treatment for chlorine exposure.

Chlorine vapor from a rail car unloading operation was sent to a scrubber designed to capture it. The absorbent caustic in the scrubber was exhausted, so chlorine passed through and was released. The CSB's preliminary findings cited improper safety practices and failure to follow written procedures; the final report noted the company's lack of engineering safeguards.

The CSB issued its final report on February 28, 2007, with 14 recommendations, including better scrubber safeguards and integrating police into hazmat incident command.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Scrubber Caustic Exhausted
The scrubber's absorbent was used up, so chlorine passed through it.
Finding 02
No Engineering Safeguards
The CSB recommended interlocks to stop chlorine flow on high oxidation-reduction potential, automatic caustic addition or backup scrubbing, and at least 8% final caustic concentration.
Finding 03
Procedures Not Followed
Scrubber SOPs needed clear operating limits and warnings about over-chlorination, with training and verification.
Finding 04
Responders Exposed
Ten police officers were among those treated; the CSB recommended integrating police into incident command, radio interoperability, protective equipment, and hazmat training.
Finding 05
Over-Chlorination Chemistry
The CSB asked the Chlorine Institute to clarify bleach decomposition hazards in its scrubber guidance.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Single point of failure
The scrubber was the only barrier and had no automatic protection against exhaustion.
2
Procedural failures
Operating limits were not clear or followed.
3
Emergency response gaps
Police responders were not integrated into incident command or equipped for chlorine.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ DPC Enterprises (6)
Add layers of protection on scrubbers, revise SOPs with operating limits, train and verify operator understanding, include scrubbers in PHAs with offsite consequences, use an independent PSM/RMP auditor, and implement a certified safety management system.
→ Glendale Fire Department (2) and Police Department (4)
Integrate police into hazmat incident command, fix radio interoperability, brief and equip responding officers, provide hazmat and respirator training, and hold joint exercises.
→ Maricopa County Air Quality (1)
Require a minimum 8% scrubber caustic concentration in DPC's permit, verified by laboratory measurement.
→ Chlorine Institute (1)
Clarify over-chlorination chemistry and bleach decomposition hazards in scrubber guidance.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
A scrubber is a safeguard only if you know it still has capacity.
Interlocks should stop flow before an emission control device is overwhelmed.
PHAs must cover emission control systems and offsite consequences.
First responders other than firefighters need hazmat training and a role in incident command.
SOP: Operating ProceduresPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisTRN: TrainingEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Alarm Defeat, Normalization of Deviance & Safety Culture
►How do we know our scrubber has capacity left?
►What stops flow if the scrubber is exhausted?
►Do our PHAs cover emission controls?
►Are local police included in our emergency planning?
Immediate Action Items
✓Add scrubber capacity monitoring with interlocks.
✓Include emission control systems in PHA scope.
✓Invite police to emergency drills.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (SOP · PHA · TRN · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
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Training & Operator Competency
Workers must understand process hazards — not just the steps on the page. Training records, refresher frequency, and verified competency are all OSHA PSM requirements.
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Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
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