Storage Tank Failure — Investigation Ongoing
Nippon Dynawave Packaging Fatal Tank Failure
Nippon Dynawave Packaging Company, LLC
📍 Longview, WA
Incident: May 26, 2026 • CSB Report: Investigation ongoing (update released August 28, 2026)
11
Fatalities
3
Seriously Injured
Hot (200°F) Caustic White Liquor — ~900,000 Gallons Released
Chemical / Hazard
Pending
CSB Recommendations
📋 Incident Summary

At about 7:09 a.m. on May 26, 2026, a 1.2-million-gallon atmospheric storage tank (G Tank) catastrophically failed at the Nippon Dynawave Packaging pulp and paper mill in Longview, Washington. It released about 900,000 gallons of scalding (200°F), highly caustic white liquor into a courtyard and nearby buildings where employees were gathered for morning meetings. Eleven employees were killed and three were seriously injured; five more employees and one firefighter had injuries not requiring inpatient hospitalization.

The CSB found that a July 2025 inspection, about ten months earlier, identified that significant portions of the tank's carbon-steel shell had thinned below the calculated minimum safe thickness. The contractor's report said the tank was not fit for continued service unless repaired. Inspections in October 2025 and February 2026 found the same, but the tank was not repaired, removed from service, or operated at reduced conditions.

On the day of the failure, a process upset stopped flow out of the tank while white liquor kept flowing in, raising the level to about 90 percent. The CSB investigation is ongoing and no recommendations have been issued.

🔎 Key Findings
Finding 01
Shell Below Minimum Thickness
Inspections found portions of the shell thinner than the calculated minimum safe thickness.
Finding 02
Warned the Tank Was Not Fit for Service
The July 2025 inspection report said the tank was not fit for continued service unless repaired, with a high likelihood and consequence of failure.
Finding 03
Tank Left in Service
Despite repeat findings in October 2025 and February 2026, the tank was not repaired or taken out of service.
Finding 04
High Level Before Failure
A process upset stopped outflow while inflow continued, raising the level to about 90 percent.
Finding 05
People Gathered Nearby
Employees were gathered in the courtyard and nearby buildings for morning meetings.
🔍 Root Causes
1
Under investigation
The CSB has not issued final causes.
2
Areas being examined
Mechanical integrity, inspection and maintenance practices, actions after inspections, operating conditions, emergency response, and regulations.
3
Final report pending
Findings and any recommendations will be in the CSB's final report.
☑ CSB Recommendations
→ Investigation ongoing
The CSB has not issued recommendations. Findings and any recommendations will be published in its final report.

Full recommendation text and current status: CSB investigation page.

💡 Lessons Learned
An inspection finding that equipment is unfit for service requires action: repair, derate, or remove it.
Track inspection recommendations to closure with management accountability.
Tank failures can release enormous volumes instantly; consider where people gather.
Process upsets can push degraded equipment past its limits.
MI: Mechanical IntegrityPHA: Process Hazard AnalysisSOP: Operating ProceduresEAP: Emergency Planning
🔨 Safety Meeting Toolbox Talk
Topic: Large Tank Implosion Hazard & Vacuum Prevention
►Do we have any equipment with open fit-for-service findings?
►Who decides whether degraded equipment stays in service?
►Where do people gather relative to large tanks?
►How do upsets affect tank levels?
Immediate Action Items
✓Review all open inspection findings for tanks and vessels.
✓Require documented decisions to repair, derate, or remove equipment below minimum thickness.
✓Evaluate occupied areas near large storage tanks.
🔗 PSM Failures Behind This Incident

This incident involved breakdowns across 4 PSM-related areas (MI · PHA · SOP · EAP). Each represents a gap that process safety programs are designed to close.

Mechanical Integrity (MI)
Equipment must be designed, inspected, and maintained to operate safely in its intended service. Mechanical integrity failures contributed to loss of containment here.
Supporting documents in our library →
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
A structured PHA or HAZOP study exists to identify exactly these scenarios before they occur. When PHA is absent, superficial, or overdue for revalidation, hazards operate unseen until they kill someone.
Supporting documents in our library →
Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Operators cannot reliably hold safe operating limits without clear, current, enforced procedures. Deviation from acceptable operating conditions is a direct consequence of SOP failure.
Supporting documents in our library →
Emergency Planning & Response
When process safety barriers fail, emergency response capability determines whether the outcome is controlled or catastrophic. Gaps in emergency preparedness amplified the consequences here.
Supporting documents in our library →
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